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RICHARD STITH 
New Constitutional and Penal Theory in Sp,anish 
Abortion Law 
The abortion debate in the United States is a clash of individual-
isms: the proponents of individual rights for putative unborn per-
sons array themselves against the advocates of individual rights for 
women. Although the Left sides almost exclusively with the latter,1 
it is hard to discern anything more than a tactical nexus of abortion-
related issues with the socialist goal of community-based 
decisionmaking. 2 
Not so in European law. The important 1975 West German deci-
sion mandated, laws against abortion from a dramatically communi-
tarian perspective,3 as has been so ably pointed out by Donald 
Kommers. 4 The Spanish Constitutional Court decision of 11 April 
RICHARD STITH is Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. The author is indebted 
for assistance to Professors Antonio Carlos Pereira, Antonio Garcia Cuadrado, Cole 
Durham, Mary Ann Glendon, John GorbyJ Donald Kommers and John Potts, as well 
as to Paige Cunningham. 
1. Mark Tushnet, a former coordinator and still a frequent speaker for the 
Critical Legal Studies movement, has called the right to reproductive choice "a lef-
tish sort of right which, it is said, leftists must recognize as not relative lest they lose 
their political credentials." Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights," 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 
1365 (1984). Note, however, that Tushnet goes on to argue such a right would no 
longer make sense even to leftists in a society slightly different from our own. See 
also infra n. 21. 
2. Quintana Ripolles,. in his historical analysis of abortion legislation, is puzzled 
by the fact that at the political level European socialists have long tended to favor 
more elective abortion, despite the .. individualism" he sees represented by such a po-
sition. He theorizes that past explicit use of anti-abortion laws to increase the ar-
mies and labor forces of capitalist nations may have caused socialists to oppose such 
laws. I would add that Left commitments to sexual equality could also point in this 
direction. But neither demographic decline nor women's equality seems necessarily 
to further the development of socialism. 1 Tratado de Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, 
504-05 (1962). 
3. Decision of 25 February 1975, [1975] :39 BVerfGE 1. Translated into English 
by Jonas & Gorby, "West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v~ Wade-
with Commentaries," 9 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 551 (1976). 
4. Kommers, ''Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany,'' 
25 Am. J. Comp. L. 255, 280-284 (1977) and "Liberty and Community in Constitu-
tional Law: The Abortion Cases in Constitutional Perspective,'' 1985 Brigham 
Young U. L. Rev. 371, 391-399. For a quite useful critique from an individualist per-
spective,-see Gerstein & Lowry, "Abortion; Abstract Norms, and Social Control: The 
Decision of the West German 'Federal Constitutional Court,,. 25 Emory L.J. 849 
(1976). 
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1985,5 which was strongly influenced by the German one,6 is in 
many (but not all) ways even more communitarian than that prior 
opinion. Indeed, it may not be too much to say that social constitu-
tional jurisprudence in the West may well find a landmark in this 
Spanish case. Socialism is relevant to abortion after all, but in a way 
quite different from that which might superficially have been 
expected. 
The key point, to be developed below, is that the Spanish court 
considers the fetus neither a person possessing rights, as U.S. pro-
life people argue, nor subject to a person possessing rights, as pro-
choicers argue. Instead, unborn life is treated as a distinct constitu-
tionally protected legal good. The nature of this Spanish status of 
the fetus as a public value will be elucidated in this commentary, 
and its status will be compared with that of unborn life according to 
the highest tribunals of Germany and the United States. 
It will further be seen that the use of this value to require the 
prohibition of elective abortion is intimately linked in Spain, more 
explicitly than in Germany, with the communitarian ideal of the 
"Social State". U.S. constitutional doctrine, being much more indi-
vidualist, might well not have required such a result even if the fe-
tus had been recognized by our Supreme Court to have a very high 
public value. 
Yet the Spanish and German decisions contain a surprise: At 
the same time that they base the protection of fetal life on the im-
portance of public values, they withdraw that protection when con-
tinuation of a pregnancy is "too mu<:h to demand" or 
"nondemandable" ("inexigible" and "unzumutbar", in the words of 
the Spanish and German courts respectively) of the individual preg-
nant woman. I will point out that abortion in such hardship cases 
may come under a paradoxical category of penal theory in which in-
dividuals are legally justified (not merely eJ(CUsed) in doing that 
which from the standpoint of public legal values remains unjustified. 
5. Decision of 11 April1985, STC 53/1985 (Pleno). The official version was first 
published in 119 Boletin Oficial del Estado [hereinafter BOE] 10 (suplemento, 18 
mayo 1985), but I have hereinafter cited the clearer and perhaps more accessible 
1985-49 Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional [hereinafter BJC] 515. 
6. I do not believe this assertion to be controversial. The Spanish decision re-
fers repeatedly to the German one in summarizing arguntents of counsel. ld. at 521, 
523, 526, 527. In the Comision de Justic1.a e Interior debates on 25 February 1983, 
opposition leader Ruiz Gallard6n referrea to the government's repeated statements 
that German law had been an inspiration for the present abortion depenalization 
proposal. The responding Justice Minister, Ledesma Bartret, did not dispute this as-
sertion. Cortes Generales, Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, II Legislatura, 
Num. 18, 1983 at 6 ff. According to Ernst Benda, former President of the Constitu-
tional Court of West Germany, the Spanish Court itself has been modeled on the 
German one. See "Constitutional Jurisdiction in West Germany," 19 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l. L. 1 (1981). 
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This individualist doctrinal counterthrust may be just as important 
as the communitarian expansion occurring in the same Spanish 
abortion case. References to Germany and to the U.S. will again 
make this clear. 
Before turning to case analysis, however, it would be well to de-
fine with greater precision the basic categories I have been and will 
be using: To the degree to which a "community" (or "socialism") 
exists, shared public values are effectively pursued by all. As long 
as those values inhere in states of being rather than in conduct con-
sidered right in itself, rules are unimportant. For example, if neigh-
bors were to gather to build a common barn, it would be silly to set 
down rules granting individual claim rights to hammers. There 
would no doubt be temporary rule-like guidelines provided, in order 
to aid coordination, but the common goal would be to use hammers 
wherever they are most needed. No individual would insist on get-
ting his or her prescribed turn with a hammer, if a neighbor could 
use it better for their shared purpose. 
By contrast, to the degree to which a society is 'individualist', 
there are no public values. All goals are personal and private, and 
human beings interact only insofar as necessary in order for each to 
\ 
achieve his or her private values. Consequently, rules are very im-
portant. For example, if a number of individuals are constructing 
their own separate barns, and there is a scarcity of tools, they will 
surely set down a set of rules for sharing hammers. These rules will 
differ from the temporary guidelines used by the neighbors above 
not only in their substance but also in their lack of flexibility. Pri· 
vate planning requires certainty about rules, requires rights. This is 
particularly so if the others involved are competitors or even ene-
mies, so that one is disinclined to relinquish a turn at the hammer 
even if one happens to have run out of nails. 
At a constitutional level, a court might impose one or the other 
of these models. It might insist that the State require all to work 
together for a common goal (e.g., life), or it might insist that the 
State refrain from coordinating common pursuits in order to further 
the private values of individuals. Or, of course, it might do neither 
and let the whole matter remain in the hands of legislatures . 
• 
CHRONOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF THE DECISION 
Prior to the bill here at issue, the Spanish Penal Code did not 
explicitly exempt any abortions from punishment.7 However, the 
general defense of necessity includes an exemption for acts done to 
. . 
7. Codigo Penal arts. 411--417. Published as Codigo Penal y legislacion comple-
mentaria (1984). 
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avoid harm equal to or greater than the harm caused,8 which would 
make non-punishable at least those abortions necessary to preserve 
maternal life.9 
Soon after the sweeping Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol 
(PSOE) electoral victory of 1982, which gave the party an absolute 
majority in the Spanish legislature, the new government propoSe'd 
an addendum to prior abortion law,10 declaring abortion unpunish-
able in certain circumstances. As approved by the Congress of Dep-
uties on 6 October 1983, and by the Senate on 30 November 1983, the 
bill read: 
Abortion will not be punishable if performed by a physi-
cian, with the consent of the woman, when any one of the 
following circumstances is present: 
1. That it is necessary in order to avoid a serious dan-
ger to the life or health of the pregnant wo:man. 
2. That the pregnancy is the consequence of an act 
constituting the crime of rape under art. 429, provided that 
the abortion is performed within the first twelve weeks of 
gestation and that the aforementioned act has been 
reported~ 
3. That it is probable that the fetus will be born with 
serious physical or mental defects, provided that the abor-
tion is performed within the first twenty-two weeks of ges-
tation and that the unfavorable prognosis is registered in an 
opinion issued by two medical specialists other than the one 
operating on the pregnant woman.11 
The post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 established for 
the first time a Constitutional Court with the }lower of judicial re-
view of statutes.12 Consistent with the Kelsenian European tradi-
tion, a petition alleging, unconstitutionality may be interposed by 
8. Codigo Penal art. 8(7). 
9. The supplemental brief of the anti-abortion petitioners (dated 3 January 
1983[sic]) further states that in practice abortion was never punished when done for 
any of the reasons listed in the government's abortion depenalization bill, found in-
fra note 11 and accompanying text. Therefore, the brief argues, statutory reform 
serves no purpose except to prepare the way for fully elective abortion. 
10. The addendum was to be inserted at the end of the existing sections on abor-
tion and numbered "417 bis." 
11. This is a translation of the bill as it appears in the Constitutonal Court's 
opinion STC 53/1985, of 11 April, as published in the BJC, supra n. 5 at 531, which is 
slightly modified in capitalization and punctuation from the version earlier printed_ 
in the BOE, supra n. 5. 
12. The Court is made up of twelve members (four chosen by three .. fifths of the 
Congress, four by three-fifths of the Senate, two by the current government, and two 
by the General Council of the Judicial Power), as authorized by art. 159(1) of the 
Constitution of 1978 [as found in Leyes politicas del Estado (1984)]. Members are 
elected for nine-year terms, which are staggered over three-year cycles. Art. 159(3). 
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certain authorized persons, without the need to await a concrete in-
jury.13 A 1979 sub-constitutional law, repealed in 1985, further es-
tablished the right of these same persons to insist that the Court 
hear such a petition before certain allegedly unconstitutional bills 
could enter into effect.14 
On 2 December 1983, the latter sort of petition was filed in the 
name of fifty-four Deputies led by the conservative Alianza Popular 
party~ After receiving a series of supplements and responses during 
the first half of 1984, the Constitutional Court finally announced its 
decision on 11 April 1985. The abortion reform bill was declared in 
certain details to be an unconstitutional violation of article 15 of the 
Constitution, which reads "All have the right to life and to physical 
and moral integrity .... " ("todos tienen derecho ala vida y ala in-
tegridad fisica y moral" ... "). Although the twelve members of the 
Court were evenly divided for and against this declaration, Spanish 
practice in effect permitted a second and tie-breaking vote to be cast 
by the President of the Court, Dr. Manuel Garcia Pelayo y Alonso, 
an ex-soldier for the Spanish Republic who became an internation-
ally-known scholar during his years outside of Spain.15 
After a lengthy development of the arguments presented by the 
petitioners and by the governmental respondent, the Court built its 
position on twelve ''Legal Foundations'' (Fu-ndamentos Juridicos), 
concluding with the holding of unconstitutionality. Five dissenting 
opinions, one of which is co-authored, follow. 
The Court's argument in brief paraphrase is this: Human life is 
a superior constitutional value (Legal Foundation, hereinafter L.F., 
_3) and a Social State such as Spain has an affirmative duty to secure 
it by law (L.F. 4). :This life is a reality distinct from the mother 
from the beginning of gestation and, therefore, the "one to be born" 
(nasciturus)16 must be considered a "legal good" (bien juridico) ac-
13. Art. 162(1)(a} of the Constitution of 1978. 
14. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (Ley Organica 2/1979, de 3 de oc-
tubre, del Tribunal Constitucional) art. 79(2). Repealed by Ley Organica 4/1985, de 7 
de junio (BOE num. 137, de 8 de junio).- · 
15. The vote was not exactly along socialist vs., conservative lines. Of the six 
members of the "majority", two were those nominated by the General Council of the 
Judicial Power. The Court's p~esident had been approved by the PSOE. The re-
maining three were originally proposed by the old centrist party, the UCD, which 
virtually disappeared in the 1982 elections. The only woman on the court co-au-
thored the resulting Court opinion. "El tribunal de los 12," El Pats, 12 April1985, p. 
13. Additional chronological and biographical details may be found on the same 
page. See also "Asi votaron los doce magistrados," Ya, 12 April 1985, p. 5, and Diario 
16, 12 April1985, pp. 6-7. 
16. The Latin word "nasciturus" is here translated literally into English. despite 
the resultant oddity of speaking of the "one to be born, perhaps being aborted. "Fe ... 
tus" would not be an acceptable alternative because the Spanish court had available, 
and elsewhere used, the equivalent '1eto". Simply leav.ing the term untranslated 
would also not be appropriate; for the Latin word would not have the same feel in 
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corded protection by the Constitution. Legislative history indicates 
that the framers of the Constitution intended this result (L.F. 5), 
even though neither Spanish nor international law requires the con-
clusion that the one to be born possesses a personal subjective right 
to this protection (LL.FF. 5, 6, and 7). Such protection must be ef-
fective and, if necessary, include penal sanctions, although it need 
not be absolute (L.F. 7). 
The Constitution also guarantees personal dignity, which in-
cludes rights such as free development of one's personality, physical 
and moral integrity, and personal and family intimacy (L.F. 8). 
When constitutional values collide, the legislator must weigh them 
and try to harmonize them or, if necessary, to specify the conditions 
under which one may prevail. He must also not forget the limits to 
what is reasonably demandable by the penal law. In carrying out his 
judgments, he need not turn only to the generalized exemptions 
from punishment found in article 8 of the Penal Code, but may use a 
different technique for certain crimes such as abortion (L.F. 9). 
After disposing of statutory vagueness problems by indicating, 
for example, that a "serious danger" is one which involves an impor-
tant and permanent diminution of physical or mental health (L.F. 
10) the Court applies the foregoing principles to the bill in ques-
tion. There is nothing unconstitutional in permitting the destruction 
of unborn life where the mother's life is at stake. Given a "serious 
danger" to her health, the mother's own right to life and to physical 
integrity is affected; not to punish abortion here :is constitutional, es-
pecially in light of what is demandable by penal law. Rape violates 
personal dignity in the highest degree, and the law clearly cannot 
demand that the victim bear its consequences. As for the case of se-
rious physical or mental fetal defects, recourse to penal sanctions 
against abortion would impose conduct beyond that which is nor-
mally demandable of a mother (L.F. 11). 
The constitutionality of the non-punishment of abortion in such 
circumstances has thus been established, according to the Court. 
However, the State continues to have an obligation effectively to 
guarantee the life and health both of the woman and of the one to 
be born. It must, therefore, make sure that neither the former nor 
the latter is disprotected any more. than may be required by those 
circumstances. For the protection of the woman, the State should 
provide that the abortion take place in public or private health cen-
ters authorized for this purpose. For the protection of the one to be 
English as it would in Spanish. "Nasciturus" would connote a birth-related being to 
the educated Spanish reader, both because of its clear link to the Spanish nacer (to 
be born) and because of its most frequent use in civil law contexts where, in fact, the 
expectation of birth is uppermost in mind. 
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born, in order to be certain that the first type of circumstance (seri-
ous maternal life or health danger) exists, the Constitution demands 
that the opinion of a medical specialist be obtained prior to the abor-
tion. Similarly, the opinions of the two specialists regarding any fe-
tal disabilities must be_ obtained in advance of any abortion. Such 
changes, without excluding other possible ones, would permit the 
bill finally to be enacted into law (L.F. 12).17 
In the last two sections of its opinion, the Court declines to re-
quire paternal participation in the abortion decision (L.F. 13), or to 
enter into subsidiary civil law issues such as the_ relation of non-pun-
ishable abortion to social insurance. It does point out, though, that 
conscientious objection to abortion is protected by the Constitution 
(L.F. 14). 
PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE FOR THE COMMUNITY 
The Constitutional Court of Spain finds that the one to be born 
has not been shown to possess any constitutional rights. At the 
same time, the fetus is protected by the Constitution, and indeed is 
protected by the sentence "All have the right to life. . . ." Let us 
look more closely at the reasoning and results of these apparently 
contradictory findings by the Court. 
The idea that our objective legal duties necessarily correspond 
to others' subjective rights is not universal;18 being in the form we 
know it a development of late scholastic-nominalism19 and Enlight-
17. The government did not delay in complying with the Court's demands. On 
12 July 1985, a new enactment was published in BOE, supra n. 5 no. 166. (Ley Or .. 
ganica 9/1985, de 5 de julio, de reforma del articulo 417 bis del Codigo Penal.) The 
significant changes are as follows: The new law contains a preliminary paragraph 
requiring abortions to be_ done in an accredited health center, and requires a prior 
second medical opinion confirming that an abortion is necessary to avoid a serious 
danger to the life or health (which now explicitly includes mental health) of the 
pregnant woman. The law, however, does not require the second opinion {nor the 
woman's express consent) in an emergency. A new section indicates, in accordance 
with a remark of the Court, that the pregnant woman will not be punished even 
when an (otherwise non-punishable) abortion occurs in violation of the requirements 
of a health center or of confirming medical opinions. 
Regulations setting accreditation standards have become a focus of controversy 
under the new law. 
18. See e.g., Lacruz Berdejo, "El Derechjo Subjetivo,." -3 Elementos de Derecho 
Civil, Parte General, 77 ... 87 (1984). See also _Benn, "Rights," in 7 Encycl. Phil. 195 
(1967), Benditt, Rights 3-8 (1982) and Hart, "Bentham on Legal Rights," in Simpson 
(ejd.), Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence (second series) 171 ... 202 (1973). The best short 
histories in English of the idea of a right may be Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights 205~210 (1980) and Golding, "The Concept of Rights: A Historical Sketch/' in 
Bandman & Bandman (eds.), Bioethics and Human Rights, (1978). See also Gold-
. . 
ing's more refined "Justice and Rights: A Study in Relationship;; Shelp (ed.), Jus-
tice and Health Care 23•35 (1981). 
19. Prof. Michel Villey has defended the thesis that William of Ockham was 
among the first fully to conceptualize subjective rights over property. Ockham did 
so, according to Villey, in order to permit the Franciscans more easily to renounce 
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enment individualism. Some cultures apparently have no need to 
reify the benefits 'of the legal order and ascribe the ownership of 
these abstract benefits (primarily, the power to choose to make 
claims) to individual actors or subjects (whence "subjective,). Even 
today, we ordinarily think of the criminal law as a set of duties 
which do not respond to individual claims. l certainly have a duty 
not to steal from my neighbor, but only the State, not my neighbor, 
has the right to insist that I not do so under pain of criminal sanc-
tion. Analytically, the idea that duties need not .entail rights is de-
fended by a number of philosophers today.2o The rise of socializing 
legal theory has also put pressure on the idea of individual claim 
rights. as a foundation of the legal order.21 
The received European legal protections accorded to the fetus 
cannot easily be squeezed into this modern subjective rights ideol-
ogy.22 Of the many nations following Continental traditions, appar-
ently only Argentina has. seen fit to acknowledge civil personality 
from the moment of conception.23 The image of the person as a bar-
gainer and a litigator indeed does not seem applicable to unborn life. 
Of course, children after birth likeWise possess these traits of legal 
personality only in potentia; yet they are accorded. personhood 
such rights and thus to fulfill their radical vows of poverty. At the same time as 
they renounced civil claims to property, they could continue to administer and to 
use it in a physical sense. See Villey~ ~'Droit subjectif:' Seize essais de philosophie du 
droit 140 (1969). 
20 .. See, e.g., the fine arguments .and citations in Weiss, "The Perils of Per-
sonhood," 89 Ethics 66 (October 1978), and in Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy 
174 ff. and notes (1977). See also Feinberg. Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty 
135~39, 144 (1980). The inverse proposition, that the absence of rights need not entail 
the absence of duties has been well and relevantly put in Montague, "Two Concepts 
of Rights," 9 Phil. and Pub . .A/f. 372, 384 (1980): 
I suppose there is a sense in which I would deny that those incapable of 
acting intentionally have rights, but I do not see that doing so has any mor-
ally objectionable consequences. It isn't as if, for example, that by denying 
that infants have a right to self-defense I am sanctioning infanticide; what I 
have said here implies only that the immorality of infanticide cannot be 
grounded on the rights of infants. Infanticide as well as such things as 
cruelty to animals and non-therapeutic experimentation -on the severely re-
tarded is immoral even if infants, animals, and the severely retarded have 
no (exercisable) rights. 
21. Lacruz Berdejo, supra n. 18 at 85. See, e.g., Marx, ••on the Jewish Question," 
Early Writings 211, esp. 230-231 (1975) and Sandel; Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (1982)~ The socialist Mark Tushnet (supra n. 1) and Louis M. Seidman have 
explicitly argued for the permissibility of fetal protection on a non-rights basis in "A 
Comment on Tooley•s 'Abortion and Infanticide','' 96 Ethics 350 (January 1986). 
Mirjan Damaska•s comprehensive new treatise contrasting the reactive and the 
activist state is a particularly rich theoretical context within which to understand 
the relative absence of rights in socialist law. See The Faces of Justice and State Au-
thority 83 (1986). 
22. Lacruz Berdejo, id. at 93·94. 
23. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 477. But cf. Jimenez de Asua, arguing that 
the fetus still does not count as a "visible person" under Argentine law. 6 Tratado 
de derecho penal988 n. 36 (2nd ed., 1962). 
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(though the exercise thereof is necessarily by a representative),- so 
. . 
that the exclusion of fetuses remains problematic.24 In any event, 
prior to 1985 many or most Spanish legal theorists granted the fetus 
a status lower than that of a person, perhaps even lower than that 
recognized in France or Italy.25 
Anti-abortion strategy during the constitutional debates if any-
thing reenforced the non-personhood of the fetus. Fearful that the 
sentence "All persons have the right to life ... "could be read to pro-
tect only those who under the Civil Code had personality,-i.e., those 
who had been born and were able to survive twenty-four hours,26 
opponents of abortion substituted the sentence "All have the right 
to life ... ", for the explicit purpose of protecting the unborn from 
abortion.27 It became difficult for a court to say that a fetus is a con-
stitutional person when the word ''person, had been struck from the 
Constitution in order to ensure the inclusio.n of fetuses. 
The Constitutional Court in fact does not argue the issue of 
legal personality as_ such. Instead, it considers the closely relate_d (if 
not ultimately identical in modern law) issue of whether fetuses are 
titulares, i.e., bearers or- possessors, ·of a subjective constitutional 
right to life. It finds that they are not, a conclusion in accordance 
with the mainstream of Spanish legal tradition. 
The Court nevertheless was faced with the apparently unani-
mous opinion of Spanish medical associations that the unborn child 
is a living human being.28 From the materials available, the govern-
24. The existence of infant persons can support the assertion that potentiality is 
sufficient for personhood and therefore that the unborn are likewise persons. See 
Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola 709. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice 509 (1971), 
maintaining that potential rationality must be the basis f.or a non-arbitrary recogni-
tion of rights. See also infra n. 43 and accompanying text for the German high 
court's argument. Contrary resolutions are possible. It is common today for abor-
tion-related philosophizing to end in approval of infanticide. See, e.g., the authors 
Tooley and Warren cited by Weiss, supra n. 20. 
25. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 471 ff. See also Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho 
penal espanol, Parte ·Especial,- 100 n .. 42 (7th ed., 1979), arguing that feticide has 
never been considered homicide. See generally Cuello Cal6n, 2(2) Derecho Penal 522 
(13th ed., 19.72). Not all the juristic data are clear. For example, for civil purposes 
the prenatal child is conditionally considered born and the possessor of rights, · pro-
vided that it eventually emerges viable from the womb. Codigo Civil art. 29. Pub-
lished as Codigo Civil (8th ed., 1984). In criminal law, the Penal Code prohibits 
consensual abortion under the title "Crimes against Persons" ("Delitos contra las 
personas"), Codigo Penal, Titulo VIII. 
26. Codigo Civil, arts. 29-30. 
27. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, Num. 105, 6 July 1978, at 3952 ff. See also 
the summary of these debates at L.F. 5 of the decision presently being considered. 
28. The petitioners submitted statements from various medical associations to 
this effect, and the government submitted none to the contrary, or at least none the 
Court thought worth mentioning. See BJC,_ supra n. 5 at 525. See also The Human 
Life Bill S. 158, Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress (1981), arguing that there is a 
scientifie consensus concerning the fact that life begins at conception but not con-
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ment does not appear to have disputed the physical fact of human 
life prior to birth. Instead, it approached the issue wholly formalisti-
cally, arguing that legal norms are independent of non-legal facts ·a 
hard position to take when it comes to documents like constitutions 
which are meant to limit the legal order for the sake of a socially 
preferred physical reality. Moreover, the Court conceded that the 
substitution of "all" for "all persons" had been intended to protect 
nascent life. How could the Court conceptualize the legal status of 
living but unborn human beings? 
Traditional Spanish legal doctrine may have provided some 
help, Not all legal goods in Spanish law have to pertain to individu-
als, or even to the State, in the manner of property ownership. 
Goods in the public domain and communal goods have long been 
recognized.29 It_ has been argued that society, rather than the fetus 
or the mother, is the titular of the protection accorded to the un-
born child.30 Anti-abortion spokespersons had argued that even 
without a subjective right, the fetus may be protectable by an objec-.. 
tive norm, as a "-social good".31 The Spanish Supreme Court (which 
does not have the power of judicial review nor of authoritative con-
stitutional interpretation given to the Constitutional Court) indeed 
asserted in its decision of 11 January 1984 that 
Human life in formation is a good that constitutionally 
merits protection, is a constitutional legal good, a legal good 
of the community and not an individual legal good .... 32 
Even spokespersons for the right to abortion were willing to 
concede that the unborn are a legal good of the community.33 Some 
interpreted such a concession to mean, however, that what the com-
munity possessed it could dispose of by its representatives in the leg-
islature, and thus that the legislative depenalization of abortion was 
constitutionally permissible.34 Perhaps for this reason, the anti-
. ' 
cerning the value to be accorded to that life. The U.S. report was cited by the Span-
ish petitioners in their brief of amplification, dated 3 January 1983 [sic], at 7. 
29. Lacruz Berdejo, supra n. 18 at 42 ff., especially 51·55. 
30. Quintana Ripolles. supra n. 2 at 477, reports some support for all three 
possibilities. 
31. Diaz Fuentes calls the fetus a "social good.,, in Diario de Sesiones del Con-
greso, No., 105, 5 October 1983; at 2943. Oscar Alzaga is cited by Cerezo Mir, in n .. 46 
of his essay "La regulacion del aborto en el proyecto de nuevo Codigo Penal Espa-
nol/' in La reforma penal (1982) to the -effect that the fetus is protected by an objec-
tive norm even without a subjective right. 
32. TS 2a Sala 15 octubre 1983, reported in La Ley 11 enero 1984 at 1. Reversed 
(in effect) on other grounds by the Constitutional Court. TC 2a Sala 75/1984. 27 de 
junio, reported in La Ley, 24 octubre 1984 _at 1. . 
33. Sotillo Marti stated his agreement with the German high court that life in 
the womb is a legal good protected by the Constitution. D'iario de Sesiones del Con-
greso de los Diputados, Sesiones informativas de Comisiones, No. 61, 7 septiembre 
1983, at 2139. 
34. The article by Luis Arroyo Zapatero discussed below at n. 69 develops the 
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abortion briefs in this case resist the idea that the one to be born is 
only a legal good rather than a possessor of the right to life.35 
Like the Spanish Supreme Court in the quotation above, the 
Constitutional Court in effect takes the traditional concept of the 
unborn as a protected legal good and inserts it into the constitu-
tional "system of values." (LL.FF. 3, 4, 9). Since the Constitution 
emanates from the community, it would seem (though the Constitu-
tional Court does not use these precise words) that the unborn are a 
legal good or value "of the community". But because of the superi-
ority of the Constitution to ordinary legislation, the community has 
in effect made a commitment to the value of unborn life such that it 
no longer retains a right freely to dispose of that life by legislation. 
The community could also be seen to be simply acknowledging a 
preexisting and binding inherent value in such life. In either case, 
one might say that the one to be born has become not so much a 
good "of" the community, in a proprietary sense, but a good "for" 
the community, a good at whose furtherance the community is 
• • mm1ng. 
It is worth pointing out that the very idea that there exists an 
objective order of values in a constitution is communitarian rather 
than individualist, because it makes the good, at least in part, public 
rather than private. Such an order (i.e., not only a list but also a hi-
erarchy) of explicit and implicit values mandates not only a mini-
mum set of formal rules which government and citizens must 
observe, but a set of goals they must aim at particularly when com-
bined with the idea of the Social State discussed later in this 
commentary. 
Within this value order, life is not just any value, according to 
the Spanish Court, but is a "superior value" (L.F. 3), a "fundamental 
value" (L.F. 5), and a "central value" (L.F. 9). The Court reaches 
this conclusion by noting that life is a presupposition for all other 
rights, and by reflecting upon the placement of the right to life at 
the head of the list of constitutional protections (L.F. 3). The un-
idea that what the community gives, the community can take away. Arroyo Za-
patero, "Prohibicion del aborto y Constitucion," Rev. Facultad de Derecho de la 
Universidad Complutense, no. 3, 195 (1980). The Constitutional Court's summary of 
the government arguments indicates that the latter admitted the existence of un-
born life as a legal good, but claimed that the legislature had discretion over its pro-
tection. BJC, supra n. 5 at 526-28. Four of the dissenters to the final decision 
conceded that preborn life is or has some kind of legal value. 
35. See e.g., the Court's summary, BJC, id. at 523, of petitioners' argument that 
life is a fundamental right or an absolute value rather than merely a legal good. 
Published anti-abortionist opinion had already rejected arguments like those of Ar-
royo Zapatero. See Federico Trillo-Figueroa ("La legalizacion del aborto en el der-
echo comparado:' at 113) and Fernando Diez Moreno ("El proyecto de Ley del 
Aborto desde la perspectiva constitucional," at 181-89) in En defensa de la vida 
(1983). 
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born are taken to ''embody" (L.F. 5) this value, both because the 
framers of the Constitution apparently intended the unborn to be 
protected by the right to life clause of that document, and because of 
the fact, noted by the Court, that human life is a Hreality from the 
beginning of gestation'' (L.F. 5). 
At the same time that the Court grants the fetus a high status 
as a "constitutionally protected legal good" (L.F. 7), it balances its 
conclusion by refusing to consider the unborn to "possess" the right 
to life, as discussed above, and by the curious and unexplained re-
mark that at birth, not before or after, the fetus acquires "full 
human individuality'' (L.F. 5). Moreover, a careful reading of the 
opinion will show that the Court never explicitly acknowledges that 
the fetus is among the ·Hall'' referred to in the protective phrase "All 
have the right to life .... '' 
Let us try to understand this argument by means of an irrever-
ent and slightly analogous hypothetical. Suppose the U.S. Constitu-
tion contained the following language: "'All bald eagles, as the 
sacred symbol of the nation, have the right to life." Suppose further 
that the framers of this clause had inserted the word "all" for the 
precise_ purpose of protecting embryonic eagles __ as well as hatched 
eagles. Would we have to conclude that inside an egg is an eagle, or 
that a bird embryo has its own constitutional rights, in order to con-
sider eagle eggs constitutionally protected? I think not. Such pro-
tection could be founded simply on our sense that an important 
meaning and purpose of the Constitution would 'be thwarte·d if eagle 
omelettes came into vogue. 
The precise effort of the Court's elevation of fetal value is this: 
The Court affirms the superiority, or even the equality, of the 
mother's rights over the legal value of the fetus at most only in 
those situations covered in the first statutory depenalization, i.e., 
where the mother's life or health is seriously endangered, both of 
which values are found in the same Constitutional article held to 
protect the unborn (L.F. 12). In order to uphold the other two 
depenalizations, the Court turns instead to the doctrine of non-de-
mandability discussed at the end of this article. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the Court implicitly holds that 
elective abortion is unconstitutional. It does so by indicating that 
the obligation to protect the fetus requires the State to make sure 
beforehand (by means of a second medical opinion) that no abor-
tions are done except where the mother is truly threatened. The ex-
act content of the Court requirement is unimportant here. The 
point is this: If elective abortion were permissible, there would be 
no constitutional life-related value infringed upon even where an 
abortion were done outside the statutory provisions. By insisting 
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that these provisions be strictly enforced in order to protect the un-
born, the Court has clearly held the complete depenalization of 
abortion to be unconstitutional.36 As a fundamental public value, de-
veloping human life cannot be- converted into purely private 
property. 
Not only did the Court manage to make this declaration in :a 
case where elective abortion was n,ot even an issue, but it did so in a 
manner highly likely to be acquiesced in by the government promot-
ers_ of abortion depenalization .. It asked only for tiny, technical ad(li-
tions to the bill~ which were soon forthcoming. Had it done more, 
had it declared a broader right to life, the government might well 
have refused to go along, provoking a constitutional crisis.37 
One essential element in the Court's argument above has not 
yet been fully explored the idea that in a Social State constitu-
tional values form not only negative limits to governmental action 
but also mold the required affirmative content of that action. This 
element has been postponed in order to develop more clearly the 
idea that the fetus has constitutional value in the first place, that the 
Spanish Constitution contains common public values (here unborn 
life) rather than only the rights of individuals. Mter a much briefer 
look at how Germany and the U.S. conceive the fetus, and some crit-
ical remarks of my own, we shall return to this postponed discussion 
of the interaction of fetal value and the Social State. 
. . 
The 1975 West German Constitutional Court decision on abor-
tion bears a striking resemblance to the 1985 Spanish ruling not 
surprisingly since, as mentioned previously, the former served in 
many ways as a model for the latter. 
Focusing upon the constitutional language "Everyone has the 
36. The Spanish court may to a degree have been inspired by similar languag~ in 
the 1975 Italian constitutional abortion decision, though the earlier phraseology 
would seem to appear in a procedural posture making it merely dictum: "[It] is the 
legislator's obligation ... to forbid the procuring of an abortion without careful as .. 
certainment of the reality and gravity of injury or danger which might happen to the 
mother as a result of the continuation of pregnancy: · Therefore the lawfulness of 
abortion must be anchored to a preceding evaluation of the existence of the condi-
tions which justify it." Carmosina et al., Corte Costituzionale. Decision of 18 Febru-
ary 1975, No. 27 [1975] 20 giur. Canst. 117. as translated in Cappelletti & Cohen, 
Comparative Constitutional Law 612~14 (1979)~ 
37. Alfonso Guerra, vice-president of the PSOE government, on 26 March 1985 
(sixteen days before the Court announced its decision) declared that if its law were 
ruled invalid. the government would be forced to set up a "machinery for pardons" 
for those obtaining abortions. The Court itself, he said, would be placed in "a so-
cially difficult situation", and he expressed regret that twelve non ... elected persons 
should impede_ the will of 350 ele.cted ones. He went on to oppose the separation of 
powers, calling it a relic of the epoch of Montesquieu, and promised to reform the 
norms governing the Court. These statements placed the justices under ''intolerable 
pressure" according to the opposition parties. ABC 12 abril 1985 at 5.3. The ·Court~s 
elegant self-defense reminds one of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803). 
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right to life ... ," (Jeder hat das -Recht aW Leben . .. )38 the German 
Court finds it unnecessary to hold the unborn child to be a person, 
or a ''bearer" of a subjective right,39 in order to include it within the 
protection of the Basic Law. Note, however, that the Court does not 
shy away from referring to the unborn's "right to life". It avoids 
. . 
only the question of whether the child is the ''bearer'' (or "posses-
sor") of this right. Perhaps the Court is thinking of analogous posi-
tive constitutional welfare "rights" for adults which need not 
necessarily give rise to individual claims presentable in a court. To 
return to our hypothetical, a similar analysis would find that bald 
eagles need not have civil law personality with access to courts in or-
der to receive constitutional protection. Both this right-to-life guar-
antee and the explicit constitutional value of ''human dignity''40 
leads the Court to rule that all human life, including prenatal life, is 
part of the "objective ordering of values" of the Basic Law.41 Even 
the dissent agrees that the State has a constitutional duty to protect 
unborn life, and indeed states that the existence of this duty is "un-
contested" (unbestritten)42 arguing further, however, that the duty 
need not be implemented by criminal sanctions. 
The German decision is somewhat more "pro-life" in its reason-
ing than the Spanish. Like the Spanish, it notes that human life_ is a 
continuum, but unlike the Spanish it does not see "full human indi-
viduality" occurring at birth. It states 
The process of development . . . is a continuing process 
which exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a 
precise division of the various steps of development of the 
human life. The process does not end even with birth; the 
phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the 
human personality, for example, appear for the first time a 
rather long time afte.r birth. Therefore, the protection . _. . 
of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the ucom-
pleted" human being after birth or to the child about to be 
born which is independently capable of living.43 
38. Basic Law (Grundge$etz) Art. 2, Sec. 2, Sentence 1. 
39. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41. See the full translation of the German decision by 
Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 641-42. 
40. Basic Law, Art. 1t Sec. 1, Sentence 1 . . Note that the Spanish constitutional 
equivalent here (Art. 10, Sec. 1, Sentence 1) refers to "the dignity of the person,. 
rather than to uhuman dignity" and played only a minor role in the Madrid decision. 
41. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41; Jonas & Gorby translation, supra n. 3 at 642.- For 
discussion, see Gerstein & Lowry, supra n. 4 at 862, 867 and materials there cited. 
42. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68 (abweichende Meinung); Jonas & Gorbyt id. at 663 
(dissent). 
43. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 638. The Court appears to rea-
son that as long as we protect newborn infants, whose human development is signifi .. 
cantly incomplete, consistency requires protection prior to birth. Indeedt consistency 
requires a theory of' protection which either values organic human life itself or else 
• 
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Moreover, it specifically holds that the constitutional word "every-
one" includes "everyone living"44 and that no distinction can be 
made, with regard to the right to life, between unborn and born 
life.45 Thus it could be argued that in Germany the fetus is in all 
but name constitutionally a person with rights, and so is closer than 
in Spain to being a full legal bearer of subjective rights. Or, put an-
other way, Germany is more individualist and Spain more communi-
tarian in their respective rationales for deference to unborn life. 
Another way to understand the two decisions, however, would 
be to note that both call the one to be born a "legal value" or a 
''legal good'' (Rechtsgut, bien juridico) rather than an individual pos-
sessing rights, although the German language is stronger concerning 
the high rank of that objective legal value. In both nations, unborn 
human life is an object more than a subject of constitutional protec-
tion, is a public value of the community rather than a private claim 
of the fetus or of the mother.46 The German Court's further con-
. 
cern with government teaching and counseling in support of prena-
tal life also has a strongly communitarian ethos behind it.47 The 
Court clearly hopes to build a common value commitment rather 
than only a balance of individual interests. 
The explicit result of such fetal value recognition in Germany, 
like that implicit in Spain, is a holding that elective abortion is un-
constitutional, even in the first three months of gestation.48 New 
life, the next generation unborn, is the concern in some sense of the 
values the developing potentiality for higher "phenomena specific to the human per-
sonality" for these are the only sources of inherent value which the infant pos-
sesses at birth. In other words, the Court argues that if we think newborns 
inherently worthy of protection, our normative theories require us also to protect 
life even in the early weeks of pregnancy. See further discussion infra, text accom-
panying n. 63-72. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. But note that the German court, despite its use of value terminology, insists 
that such value cannot be aggregated, that each particular life must be protected-
even if the sacrifice of some could lead to the preservation of a greater number. 
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 58-59; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 655-56. The refusal to aggregate is 
a departure from ordinary valuing and is more at home in discourse informed by 
rights. 
Are there ways to avoid the ruthlessness of valuing, its common callousness to-
ward particulars, without appealing to the selfishness of rights? I believe there are, 
in the ideas of respect or reverence (which perhaps may be the deep grounds of the 
German decision). See my critique of valuing, "Toward Freedom from Value;' 38 
The Jurist 48 (1978), and my brief critique of rights in "Thinking about Ecology," 
XLV(1) The Cresset 7 (1981). 
47. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 50, 57-58, 61-64; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 649, 651-55, 657-60. 
For an excellent introduction to the German constitutional jurisprudence of values, 
see Benda, "New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany," 11 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 1, 6-9 (1977). Dr. 
Benda at that time was president of the Constitutional Court. 
48. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 662 .. 63. 
• 
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whole community, not only of individual pregnant women. Never-
theless, as in Madrid, the Court in Karlsruhe moderates the force of 
this conclusion by holding that there are limits to what the commu-
nity can ask individuals to contribute to this common value, and that 
as a result laws may permit abortion in various situations of relative 
hardship.49 This individualist counterthrust will be examined fur-
ther below. 
The 1973 U.S. Supreme Court abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, is 
in surprisingly many ways similar to the Spanish and German deci-
sions. Like them, although much more strongly, it refuses to ac-
knowledge constitutional personhood or rights possessed by the 
unborn.50 And just after its finding of non-personhood, in a largely 
unnoticed portion of its decision, our Court creates a legal category 
very similar to that into which the fetus is placed in those European 
opinions: non-personal human life. That is, the U.S. court indicates 
that its conclusion of non-personhood does not yet dispose of the 
contention that there is a compelling state interest in protecting life 
from the moment of conception. It does not respond to this conten-
tion by arguing that there would be no decisive state interest in pro-
tecting such non-personal life, should it exist, but rather by 
indicating the Court's doubts as to whether the fetus is actually 
human and alive in an extra-constitutional sense. 51 Presumably, had 
the Court been sure of the existence of a living human fetus, it 
would have found a strong public concern for fetal protection, simi-
lar to that found by the Spanish and German courts. In other words, 
the U.S. court creates the same category (non-personal life imbued 
with a high public value) brought forth by those other tribunals, but 
then fails to fill it. 
It may well be this single difference, not a difference of consti-
tutional categories but a disagreement about the fact of actual 
human life, accounts for the tremendously disparate conclusions on 
abortion on the two sides of the Atlantic. For it is not only Spain 
and Germany which agree that human life exists prior to birth. The 
other four European constitutional courts which have considered the 
matter appear to have reached this same conclusion,52 and none has 
49. Very roughly speaking, the Court indicates that abortion need not be pun-
ished where the mother's life or health is at stake, or she has been raped, or the 
child will suffer from a serious health impairment, or she labors under some 
equivalent social hardship-inasmuch as each of these situations may make a contin-
uation of pregnancy not demandable by means of the penal law. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 
1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 647-49. 
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973). 
51. Id. at 159-62. See also infra n. 53. 
52. The cryptic French opinion (permitting the legislature to leave most early 
abortions unpunished) contains the phrase "Considering that the law [permitting 
abortion] referred to this Conseil Constitutionnel does not authorize any violation of 
the principle of respect for every human being from the very commencement of life 
1987] STITH: SPANISH ABORTION LAW 529 
subsequently seen fit to recognize a constitutional right to abortion 
in any way as sweeping as that of Roe v. Wade. By and large, abor-
tion has been left by them in the legislative domain. 
Yet although the Roe majority does not consider the unborn 
child to be human and alive, it holds that the fetus does have some 
public value, not as life but as "potentiallife".53 One might say that 
Europe considers the unborn child to be a living human being, al-
beit only a potential legal person, while the United States treats it as 
only a potential life. Nevertheless, there is some functional similar-
ity to these two concepts, in that both recognize the fetus to be a 
value worthy of public concern, as a "legal good" and as a "state in-
terest" respectively. 
But let us not forget that the Spanish and German decisions did 
not rest with the affirmation that the fetus is a "legal good". Those 
... except in case of necessity .... " Decision of 15 January 1975, [1975] A.J.D.A. 134, 
as translated in Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n. 36, at 577-78. For a different interpre-
tation of the French decision, see Glenn, "The Constitutional Validity of Abortion 
Legislation: A Comparative Note," 21 McGill L. J. 673, 677 and accompanying notes 
(1975). The Italian decision referred to in n. 36 supra observes that Art. 2 of the 
Constitution guarantees the inviolable rights of man, "among which must be placed, 
although with the particular characteristics unique to it, the legal situation of the 
foetus ['concepito')," at 613 of the translation, and later emphasizes obligatory protec-
tion for "the life of the foetus [:feto']," at 614, even while declaring that an embryo is 
not yet a person, at 613, and that abortions for serious maternal health reasons must 
be permitted. Corte Costituzionale, Decision of 18 February 1978, n. 27 [1975] 98 
Foro It. I (Giurisprudencia Costituzionale e Civile) 515, 516. Even the Austrian deci-
sion, which alone holds that fully elective abortion in the first three months of preg-
nancy is constitutional, seems to concede "that throughout the whole duration of the 
pregnancy both the mother's life and the nascent human life constitute constant 
life", stating that the legislature is constitutionally free to protect the fetus by mak-
ing abortion punishable, and is required to do so after viability if post-natal infanti-
cide is punishable. Decision of 11 October 1974, Constitutional Court, [1974] 
Erkliirungen des Verfassungsgerichtshofs 221, 234-35 G 8/74, as translated by Cappel· 
letti & Cohen, supra n. 36 at 615, 620-21. The Portuguese decision of 19 March 1984 
unanimously holds that the constitutional principle of the inviolability of human life 
embraces .. intrauterine human life", even though it goes on to declare a limited dis-
protection of that life to be constitutional. 344 Boletim do Ministerio da Justir;a 197, 
216, 230 (March 1985). Thus all four other European national decisions appear to 
recognize actual rather than only potential human life in the unborn and to permit 
and even to require some measure of constitutional protection for that life, with the 
precise degree of protection left largely up to the legislature. See generally, Reis, 
Das Lebensrecht des Ungeborenen Kindes als Verfassungsproblem (1984). 
Mary Ann Glendon's forthcoming work, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 
(1987), surveys the abortion laws of twenty Western nations and finds them all to be 
more sympathetic than Roe to fetal life. 
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 calls the fetus, e.g., "potential life" (at 150, 154), 
"prenatal life" (at 151, 155), "potential human life., (at 159), "only the potentiality of 
life" (at 162), "fetal life" (at 163), and "the potentiality of human life" (at 162, 164)-
the last referring to the period alter viability. It also states "We need not resolve the 
difficult question of when life begins" (at 159), and " ... a legitimate state interest 
need not stand or fall on the acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or 
at some other point prior to live birth" (at 150). Putting all this together, one gath-
ers that the Court does not know whether "life" (in the sense of "human" life) ex-
ists prior to birth, but its potentiality does in the form of "prenatal'' or "fetaP' life. 
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opinions tied unborn life to the order of constittttional values, while 
Roe did not. Perhaps the U.S. court could have done otherwise. 
While our constitutional doctrine does not acknowledge a full·blown 
hierarchy of values apparent or hidden in .our Constitution,54 the 
Supreme Court has gone beyond literal application of a set of uncon .. 
nected rules. It has discerned the value of ''privacy", for example, 
albeit linking this value to individual rights. Could our Court have 
looked at the various direct and indirect references to life in our 
fundamental law in order to give at least some attenuated constitu-
tional status to what it calls "potential life"? Or would such a com-
munitarian commitment to values be too alien to our focus on 
rights? In any event, in portions of Europe prenatal life has become 
something the State must respect, whereas in America it is only 
something the State may respect, even in the last moments before 
birth.55 
Roe, then, treats the unborn as the object of no community com-
mitment at the constitutional level, and as only the optional object 
of such a commitment at the legislative level. .And even the latter 
option is sharply limite_d. The state interest in potential life without 
constitutional status fails entirely prior to viability, when confronted 
with a pregnant woman's right to privacy.56 And even in the last pe-
riod before birth, where the state's interest is_ nominally "compel-
ling",57 it cannot compel much. Abortions destructive of the fetus 
must be permitted, even just before birth, if they promote what the 
Court calls uhealth"58 but which it defines broadly to include virtu-
ally every significant reason a woman might have for a third trimes-
ter abortion.59 Donald Kommers, in contrasting the American and 
54. But cf. Walter Murphy's attempt to construct such a system around the idea 
of "human dignity,. "An Ordering of Constitutional Values:' 53 S. Cal. L_ Rev. 703, 
744 ff. (1980). Cf. also the works of Profs. Lawrence Tribe and Frank Michelman. 
5.5. Even after viability, the· fetus need be .Protected by the State only 14[if] the 
State is_ interested in protecting fetal life" (Roe at 16_3), and Hif it chooses'-' (Roe at 
164-65). 
56. Prior to viability, abortion can be limited only in the interest of maternal 
health, not in the interest of fetal life. Id. at 163-64. 
57. ld. 
58. Id. at 165. The recent Supreme Court decision of Thornburgh v. A~C.O.G. 
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2183, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779, 799 (1986) [interim editions] reemphasizes that 
even after viability, there cannot be "any 'trade-off' between the woman's health and 
additional percentage points of fetal survival". 
59. Roe's companion case, which should be "read together'' with the former (ac-
cording to Roe at 165), defines "health" to be related to "all factors ... relevant to 
the_ well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). The Thorn-
burgh Supreme Court opinion; id., does not refer to this definition, but the Court of 
Appeals did so in the decision under review. That decision states "It is clear from 
the Supreme Court cases that 'health' is to be broadly defined. As the Court stated 
in Doe, the factors relating to health include those that are 'physical, emotional, psy-
chological, familial, [as well as] the woman~s age' [quoting from Doe]!' The court of 
appeals goes on to say that a law which punished postviability abortions which were· 
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German cases, has well described the outcome in our country: 
A woman is thus entitled to separate herself from the com-
munity while the community is rendered powerless to act 
in its common defense for the purpose of safeguarding 
shared values.so 
531 
The_ Roe result mandating elective abortion virtually throughout 
pregnancy could hardly be more at odds with the Spanish and Ger-
man decisions forbidding elective abortion even in early pregnancy. 
And that result is likewise far from that reached by other European 
nations which, given the very great but nonpersonal public value of 
prenatal life, leave the matter of abortion almost entirely up to the 
legislature. 61 
How much likelihood is there that U.S. law on abortion might 
someday approach the mainstream of Western jurisprudence? Per-
haps quite a bit. Justice O'Connor's dissent in the 1983 Akron case 
indicates a desire to find a compelling state interest in protecting the 
fetus throughout pregnancy, though there is no evidence she would 
recognize constitutional personhood prior to birth.62 If she were to 
ground her position not merely on justices; sense of the weight of 
potentiality but on the fact and value of actual life or of the consti-
tutional dignity even of potential life, then the two sides of the At-
lantic would draw much nearer to each other. 
CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE 
Individual rights for fetuses are not the only alternative to indi-
vidual rights for pregnant women. Community concern for unborn 
human life provides another way to look at the abortion problem, a 
way which I personally find superior.63 If you and I recognize some-
one's rights, we are not bound by love to him or her, nor do we feel 
between ourselves a bond of fellowship. By contrast, if we jointly 
commit ourselves to caring for another, the basis is laid both for af-
fection for the object of our concern and for community among our-
done to avoid the "potential psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the 
unborn child's survival" would be clearly unconstitutional; 737 F.2d 283, 299 (1984). 
60. Kommers, "Abortion and Constitution,'" supra n. 4 at 282. 
61. See supra n. 52. 
62. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459-
466 (1983). She reaffirmed her position, again in dissent, in Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. 
2169 at 2214, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779 _at 836-37. 
63. So I have argued in "A Critique of Abortion Rights,u 3(4) democracy 60 (fall, 
1983), and by implication in my broad attack on rights entitled ''A Critique of Fair-
ness,, 16 Valparaiso Univ~ L. Rev~ 459 (1982). See also my "Generosity: A Duty 
without a Right," in which I further explore the nature of .rightless relations among 
persons. Paper presented to the Conference on Law and the Ordering of our Life 
Together (New York, April 1987). But cf. my reservations concerning the 41value'; 
approach to human dignity in the article cited supra at the end of my ll. 46. 
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selves. The Spanish and German attitudes toward the unborn are 
much closer than the official rights-based positions of U.S. pro-lifers 
or pro-choicers to the actual feelings of parents for very. young chil-
dren. Parents feel infants neither to be their private property nor to 
be individuals negotiating-their rights at arms' length. Instead and 
for many years, a baby is the shared value of a common life. 
Yet this new perspective does not answer the question of how 
great a weight the child has before and after birth, in ordinary expe-
rience or in the law. And here I submit there is an antinomy for 
which there may well be no solution. 
On the one hand, in early pregnancy, often the fetus is not 
sensed to be present as a separate entity, and abortion is not felt to 
be a kind of homicide. 54 On the other hand, a newborn infant is con-
sidered a human being, and so is felt to possess what the German 
decision calls "inherent" (selbtstiindig} worth.65 That is, the value of 
the newborn is perceived to be inherent in its being, and not in the 
eyes of the parental or juridical beholders. 
How can these two perceptions be squared with each other? 
Obviously, by the assumption that the neonate is a different being 
from the preborn fetus. The change in being could be thought to 
come -either from a qualitative biological leap or from the infusion of 
a spiritual soul, or from both. 
Our modern quandary arises because we can no longer publicly 
affirm either basis for this assumption of discontinuity in being.66 
Human life, according to modern science, is a continuum and, as the 
German court notes, those traits (e.g., self-consciousness) for which 
many especially value our species do not arise until quite some time 
after birth. Neither can religion be the ground of a presumed 
change of being, in a pluralistic or secular society. 
Thus the belief in and commitment to the inherent value of life 
after birth requires in our day (but did not require in that of our 
great-grandparents) significant protection for the child before 
birth67 because our law can no longer cogently proclaim that there 
is a difference in kind between the born and the unborn. To put the 
matter another way, if we as a legislating community permit rela-
64. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 503, asserts that this is generally the case, at 
least as of 1962 (the year -of that edition of his treatise). 
65. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 67; Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 662. 
66. Justice Stevens' recent "pro-choice" concurrence in the Tho·rnburgh case, 106 
S. Ct. 2169 at 2188, demonstrates both the importance and the futility of such a claim 
of discontinuity. He there asserts that the permissibility of abortion hinges upon 
there being "a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a 
human being" but fails even to hint at any grounds for such a distinction. 
67. And indeed throughout pregnancy, according to the argument of the German 
court, supra n. 43. 
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. 
tively casual abortion we have rendered noncredible our commit-
ment to the inherent value of every human being even after birth. 
Yet at the same time, as private individuals involved with early 
pregnancies, we may continue not to feel the presence of' another 
human life. Consequently, abortion may seem morally permissible, 
and our main concern with the law may be not getting caught. 
There is one obvious way to cope with such dissonance: strong 
nominal legal protection for prenatal life coupled with large num-
bers of unlawful abortions.68 Other solutions, which grant the fetus 
some kind of intennediate or compromise status, are trying to mix 
oil and water. They are. in harmony neither with the intuition that 
the newborn's value is great and inherent nor with the intuition that 
early abortion concerns the pregnant woman alone. 
A brilliant and influential article by Arroyo Zapatero,69 which 
appeared in Spain in 1980, attempts to cut this Gordian Knot. There 
he proposes that concern for unborn life, wherever and to the extent 
it exists, be treated as a kind of cultural value of the community.70 
Such life would receive protection not for its own sake, but for the 
sake of the community which cares about it in a manner reminis-
cent of Lord Devlin's prohibition of homosexual activity in order to 
promote community moral solidarity,71 and of the common sugges-
tion that we prevent cruelty to animals not to protect them but to 
protect human society's sensibilities. In very early pregnancy, 
. . 
where such felt concern is minimal at best and important maternal 
rights are at stake, few if any prohibitions on abortion would be ap-
prop:riate.72 Under Arroyo's appro.ach, we need not seek to harmo-
nize pre- and post-natal intuitions about life, because only those 
intuitions (and not life itself) are being valued. 
Arroyo's solution fails because we as legislators, as scholars, and 
.as judges are not ourselves outside the community. We are not sim-
ply concerned with promoting some ethnic solidarity or sensibility 
which we do not share. We are members of the community which 
68. The model of nominal illegality can be seen as a version of "excuse, reason-
ing on abortion, which is discussed at greater length infra under the heading "The 
Doctrine of 'Too Much to Demand.~,, Guido Calabresi's works emphasize the fre· 
quent usefulness of a difference between the law as ideal and the law in practice, 
e.g., Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 88 (1985) where he contrasts the official 
. . 
prohibition of euthanasia with actual jury practice. 
69. Arroyo Zapatero, supra n. 34. The abortion decision of the Audencia de Bil-
bao of 24 March 1982 treats fetal life as a cultural value of the community. Accord-
ing to Santiago Mir Puig (''Aborto, estado de necesidad y Constitucion,'' 1982 Rev. 
Jur. Cataluna 1043, 1048, n. 1), this foundation for fetal protection entered Spain 
with Arroyo Zapatero's article and ~as then picked up by the Bilbao court. See fur-
ther supra n. 35. 
70. Supra n. 34 at 209 ff. 
71. See generally Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965). 
72. Supra n. 34 at 217 ff. 
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values human life, and as such are concerned with truly protecting 
that which we value ,.,not with affirming the value of our irrational 
valuing. Someone from Mars might like us enough to want to pre-
serve us in all our contradictory splendor, but we ourselves feel 
compelled by honesty to-find ways to resolve rather than to uphold 
our contradictions._ 
Our belief in inherent postnatal human worth cannot logically 
coexist with lawful elective or nearly elective abortion, but neither 
can logic alone induce women in distress to avoid abortion. Perhaps 
that belief will disappear someday, or be pusl1ed back to some point 
where a qualitative change (rather than only a change in location, as 
. . 
at birth) takes place in young human beings- say at self-conscious-
ness, ·or at puberty. In that case, we could hold to the inherent value 
of the latter new kind of being but refuse to p·ush that value forward 
to infantile or prenatal stages of life. Or technical developments 
such as ultrasound may in effect create windows in the womb, so 
that the intuition of inherent value can occur and have a moral ef-
fect on pregnant women even in the early months of pregnancy. 
But unless we evolve in one of these two ways, I cannot foresee a 
wholly satisfactory solution to the law's abortion dilemma. 
THE COURT AND THE SOCIAL STATE 
This commentary is presently concerned 'to understand the con-
trasting degrees of public value recognized in prenatal life in Spain, 
Germany, and the United States. We have analyzed and critiqued 
the various attempts to conceptualize the fetus as something other 
than a constitutional person or private property. We now turn to an-
other important way in which Spain and Germany are more commu"" 
nitarian than the U.S. in their treatment of fetal life as a 
constitutional value. 
The classical conception of fundamental constitutional rights is 
that of rights against the State. A right to free speech would mean, 
for example, that the State cannot punish an individual for the con-
tent of what he or she has said. But that right alone would not, say, 
give an employee a right not to be punished for speaking by an em-
ployer. A constitutional right which were construed to protect an 
employee in this circumstance, possibly via a civil damage action, 
would have Drittwirkung, efficacy against third parties. 
The right to free speech might, however, be construed still more 
broadly. It, and other related constitutional provisions, could be 
found to be simply specifications of a deeper affirmative vision of 
the good society. In this hypothetical case, that value could be taken 
to be free and open discussion~ From that value, new specific rights 
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could be derived, e.g., the right to read as well as to speak whatever 
one wished,-with or without Drittwirkung~ 
Even more, a court could hold that neither the old nor the new 
rights qua rules are what is essential. What really matters is that 
there be in the end an effective promotion of free and open discus-
sion, that the whole community in all its legislation and activity 
work together for the sake of that shared ultimate value. So, for-ex-
ample,-a state might be given the duty to subsidize small presses, or 
criminally to penalize private censorship, or to teach openminded-
ness, or otherwise to act affirmatively in ways which a constitutional 
court thought would be effective in promoting free and open 
discussion. 
This latter communitarian vision is closely related in the Span-
ish decision to the constitutional demand for a ''Social State''. 73 
Although the same ideas are clearly at work in the German court's 
insistence that the State affirmatively protect prenatal life, the 
Spanish opinion is noteworthy for the conciseness of its vision and 
the clarity of its "social'' label and linkage. Legal Foundation 4 
reads in part: 
It is also pertinent to make ... some references to the 
scope, meaning and function of fundamental rights in the 
constitutionalism of our day inspired by the social State of 
Law .... [F]undamental rights do not include only subjec-
tive defense rights of individuals against the State . . . but 
also positive duties on the part of the latter (see in this re-
spect arts. 9.2, 17.4, 18.1 and 4, 20.3 and 27 of the Constitu-
tion). But, in addition, fundamental rights ... are the legal 
expression of a system of values that, by decision of the 
framers, 'has to inform the whole legal and political organi-
zation. . . . Consequently, from the obligation of all powers 
to submit to the Constitution, one deduces not only the neg-
ative obligation of the .State not to injure the individual or 
institutional sphere protected by these fundamental rights, 
but also the positive obligation to contribute to the effec-
tiveness of such rights, and of the values that they repre-
sent, even when a subjective claim does not exist .... 74 
Such a conception is socialist rather than individualist because 
in it the State must take responsibility for the societal results of its 
laws, rather than simply setting down minimum rules of conduct 
73. Art. 1.1 reads in part "Spain is constituted as a social and democratic State of 
Law .... "(''Espana se constituye en un Estado social y democratico de Derecho ... ,) 
Other articles further this demand. Art. 9.2 emphasizes effectiveness as a constitu-
tional requirement. 
7 4. BJC, supra n. 5 at 532. 
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and letting the strong work within those rules to exploit the weak 
for the sake of private interests. 
It should not be forgotten that the issue in Spain was whether 
or not abortion must be penalized. Affirming the high constitutional 
value of unborn life, indeed even affirming fetal personhood, might 
not be in itself sufficient to do more than forbid State-sponsore_d 
abortions and, of course, allow (rather than require) anti-abortion 
legislation. The effective protection of this constitutional value had 
to become an affirmative duty of the State, ar1d criminal sanctions 
had to be seen as an empirical fact to be relatively effective, in order 
for the constitutional challenge to the Spanish government's partial 
depenalization of abortion to succeed. 
The anti-abortion briefs in this case did not neglect to promote 
the Social State doctrine almost as prominently as the value of un-
born life.75 Somewhat amusingly, the briefs of the Socialist govern-
ment argued instead for the classical individualist idea of 
constitutional rights, in which such rights are only limits to state ac-
tion and do not require coercive ·penal acts of the State.76 
Despite the latter "socialist" arguments, the Court affirmed a 
strong Social State doctrine in the abortion case and applied it to the 
fundamental constitutional value "embodied" in unborn life (L.F. 5), 
concluding: 
On the basis of the considerations brought forward in 
Legal Foundation 4, [the] protection which the Constitution 
confers on the one to be born implies for the State two obli-
gations of general character: that of abstaining from inter-
rupting or obstructing the natural process of gestation and 
that of establishing a legal system for the defense· of life 
which involves an effective protection of the same and that, 
given the fundamental character of life, includes also, as an 
ultimate guarantee, penal norms. (L.F. 7). 
Notice the finesse required by the constitutional value of life. 
While abortions. for certain reasons may be permitted, under the cu~ 
riously individualist rationale discussed below, other abortions must 
be criminally punished. But ex post facto punishment is not enough, 
as discussed above in the "Chronology and Summary of the Deci-
sion.'' In order to give adequate protection to unborn life, the penal 
75. Brief of 2 December 1983, at 9, 16-18. Violation of art. 1.1, the Social State 
provision, is the second ground of unconstitutionality brought forward by petition-
ers, just after their discussion of _art. 15, the_ right to life provision. At page 17 they 
wisely appeal to the authority of the works of Garcia Pelayo (now president of the 
Court) on the nature of the Social State. Cf., e.g., his Las transformaciones del Es-
tado contemporaneo (1977). 
76. BJC, supra n. 5 at 526. The German decision is strongly criticized. 
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laws must also require ex ante that a specialist physician certify that 
a particular reason exists before the abortion may take place. 
The dissents in Spain, as one would expect, object to the Court 
acting as a legislature. But none argues clearly that it is the Court's 
expansive concept of the Social State which is at fault. Most object 
to the Court announcing in advance the kind of statutory protec-
tions it wants, rather than waiting to strike or uphold whatever may 
be the legislative response to a finding of unconstitutionality. They 
also reject the alleged constitutional requirement to use penal sane· 
tions here and to perfect the protection given the fetus. The Court's 
attempt to discover and apply binding principles or abstract values 
latent in constitutional rules comes in for some criticism, but not the 
use of values to spell out affirmative duties of the State rather than 
only defense rights against the State. 
The opinions of the German majority and dissent yield a fuller 
understanding of the interaction of the value of prenatal life and the 
ideas underlying the Social State. The Court there not only orders 
the government to punish elective abortion, in order to fulfill its af-
firmative duty effectively to protect the one to be born, but also re-
quires that the State teach life's value in legislation and in individual 
counseling.77 This pervasive emphasis on the pedagogical function 
of law is the most strikingly communitarian aspect of the German 
decision, while it is strangely absent from the Spanish. Surely pub-
lic education is the ultimate difference between a communitarian 
law based on values and an individualist law based on rules. No 
matter how many constitutional or legislative rules are derived from 
public values, a community of shared values does not arise except to 
the extent that individuals come to aim at those values themselves 
rather than only at rule compliance. Otherwise even the most elab-
orate labyrinth of rules is only a complicated game played for the 
sake of the furtherance of private interests. 
The German dissent well recognizes the difficulties inherent in 
court enforcement of constitutional values: 
As defense rights the fundamental rights have a com-
paratively clear recognizable content; in their interpretation 
and application, the judicial opinions have developed practi-
cable, generally recognized criteria for the control of state 
encroachments for example, the principle of proportional-
ity. On the other hand, it is regularly a most complex ques-
tion, how a value decision is to be realized through 
affirmative measures of the legislature. The necessarily 
generally held value decisions can be perhaps characterized 
77. See citations supra n. 47. Contrast Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 2178·81, 
where counseling discouraging abortion is forbidden to the State. 
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as constitutional mandates which, to be sure, are assigned to 
point the direction for all state dealings but are directed 
necessarily toward a transposition of binding regulations. 
Based upon the determination of the actual circumstances, 
of the concrete setting of goals and their priority and of the 
suitability of conceivable means and ways, very different so-
lutions are possible. The decision, which frequently presup-
poses compromises and takes place in the course of trial and 
error, belongs, according to the principle of division of pow-
ers and to the democratic principle, to the responsibility of 
the legislature directly legitimatized by the people. 78 
The dissent's solution seems, however, largely to restate rather than 
to solve the problems it has raised. It urges the Court to "confront 
the legislature only when the latter has completely disregarded a 
value decision or when the nature and manner of its realization is 
obviously faulty.''79 
This last language reminds one a bit of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's "rational basis" and "state interest'' tests. But note this im-
portant difference: Except for a very limited number of impermissi-
ble goals (such as the promotion of racism), U.S. legislation may aim 
at any state interest. Or, where equal protection or fundamental 
rights are involved, it may aim at any "compelling" state interest. 
There is not, except very broadly and by negative implication, an or-
der of constitutional values which government must affirmatively 
promote. Indeed, our states may sometimes aim at values opposite 
to those underlying the Constitution as interpreted by the Court. 
A glance at the U.S. abortion decisions of the last ten years will 
make clear the contrast between American and European doctrine 
here. The original Roe decision proclaimed the value of private 
choice with regard to abortion, and saw in that value a prohibition 
on state action interfering with abortion. Yet the government is 
under no obligation to use its funds80 or its hospitals81 neutrally to 
promote choice. Instead, it may favor childbirth over abortion, even 
where its motives are the very value philosophies condemned by Roe 
as a basis for penalizing abortion. 82 In later extrapolation upon this 
conclusion, the U.S. Court specifically appealed to the classic consti-
tutionalism of defense rights only rather than the new communitar-
ian emphasis on rights to affirmative state support.83 In that later 
case, the Court ruled that even health abortions need not be funded 
78. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 71-72; Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 665-66. 
79. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 73; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 666. 
80. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
81. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977). 
82. Id. 
83. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980). 
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by the State, despite the fact that in Roe maternal health broadly 
construed had been held to be constitutionally more important than 
fetal life even after viability.84 The value decisions of our Constitu-
tion do not in themselves bind legislatures, and a fortiori need not 
be taught to· citizens. 
All this is not to say that there would be no possible way for an 
anti-abortion U.S. Supreme Court to require criminal laws against 
abortion. The Court could try to find some state action (e.g., finan-
cial) involved in depenalized private abortions, in order to forbid 
them. Or it could find state action in the enforcement of contracts 
related to abortion or of laws preventing sit-ins at abortion clinics, 
which would de facto make abortion unavailable. Or it could argue 
that equal protection, even if it were attenuated prior to birth, man-
dates some measure of protection for the unborn as long as the kill-
ing of neonates remains illegal. (Or it could go the other way and 
insist that equal protection for those who take human life requires 
that infanticide be unpunished as long as abortion is unpunished.) 
But it could nat, without a deep ideological shift, appeal to the social 
duty of the government to promote the constitutional value of re-
spect for life. 
CRITIQUE OF THE COURT AND THE SOCIAL STATE 
Though I am sympathetic both to socialism and to the protec-
tion of unborn life, I cannot agree with the approach taken by the 
Spanish and German high courts. 
My problem is not with the idea of an order of principles im-
plicit in legal rules and usable in deriving new rules. Such analogi-
cal reasoning, however indeterminate it may be, seems to me a 
necessary part of the honest and thoughtful evolution of public or-
der. It accounts for the greatest achievements both of Anglo-Ameri-
can common law and of European legal science. Nor do I object to 
the affirmative quality of these values. I think life together is much 
more meaningful if we hold some, though not all, aims in common. 
I would like to think that there are common goods, such as life, 
which many of our laws pursue and which are and ought to be 
taught to us all. 
My problem is with the institution of judicial review. Even here 
I am less concerned where only defense rights are involved. As long 
as a high court can play only a negative role, it must at least work 
very hard to achieve institutional dominance. But when judicial re-
view is combined with the vague values and affirmative duties of the 
Social State, then the power of judges may be overextended. 
84. Id. at 316, 325-26. 
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The rule of law (Estado de Derecho) itself may not survive, as 
the Spanish government argued in its brie£.85 The whole problem, 
in my view, lies in the word "effective" invoked both in Spain and in 
Germany .. In order for values to be "effectively'' promoted, empiri-
cal results rather than only rules must be scrutinized. Rules at the 
constitutional and at the legislative levels have to be changed when-
ever necessary in order to achieve results, even ex post/acto in par-
ticular cases. That is how common barn builders would handle the 
rules for hammer use. It may even be unconstitutional not to 
change the rules whenever they produce results contrary to basic 
values.86 
While I wish, with some trepidation, to affirm such rule-less 
community (or, better, communities) as an ideal to be pursued, I am 
deeply concerned about placing virtually unlitnited power over the 
development and content of such community in the potentially arbi-
trary discretion of any very small number of persons. 
Judicial review and the Social State should not be combined. 
Perhaps judicial review should not ·exist even for defense rights. 
Such review implies a hostility between the legislating community 
. 
and the individual which ideally should be overcome by education 
and by more participatory forms of democracy, rather than accom-
modated. But in any event judicial review should not extend to the 
positive and programmatic social duties stated or implied in a consti-
tution. Those principles should be the starting points for public rea-
soning by all citizens, not the privileged prerogative of a tiny group 
of jurists. 87 
85. BJC, supra n. 5 at 527 .. 28. 
86. Rule utilitarianism has no adequate response here, for it contains an antin .. 
omy. Even if we need rigid rules in order to preserve our values, why should those 
rules be followed when they seem certain to produce disvalue? A legal system 
wholly concerned about consequences could not avoid constantly rethinking its 
rules. It might avoid anarchy by disabling individual citizens or judges from ignoring 
rules, but it would have to make centralized review available in every ease where 
one could plausibly argue that a revised rule-would more efficiently promote the val-
ues at stake. For an excellent review of the proposed solutions to this general moral 
and legal quandary, see Alexander, "Pursuing the Good--Indirectly," 95 Ethics 315 
(January 1985). 
87. I do not think one should belittle a judicially unenforced constitutional social 
duty or right as "merely a platform plank elevated to constitutional status." Cf. the 
discussion of "programmatic•·' rather than uenforceable, constitutional provisions in 
Italy in Cappelletti,. Merryman, & Perillo, The Italian Legal System 58 (1967). From 
the deliberations of juries to those of supreme_ courts we often rely upon non-en-
forceable good faith implementation of legally binding principles. I do not see why 
elected representatives should enjoy less confidence. 
The Spanish constitution itself distinguishes between "rightsu and "duties'; (arts. 
14-38) and "guiding principles of social and economic politics, (arts~ 39-52), making 
the former "binding'' (arts~ 53.1 and 53.2) and the latter o:nly "informing" (art. 53~3)~ 
Perhaps values (such as .;life") latent in these rights and duties should be considered 
mere "guiding principles,, though my own view is more that they should be consid-
• 
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THE DOCTRINE OF "TOO MUCH TO DEMAND" 
Life is a "superior," "fundamental," and "central" constitutional 
value in Spain, and the fetus "embodies'' this value. The govern-
ment has an affirmative duty to protect unborn life by means of 
criminal penalties for its destruction. Yet the high court there goes 
on to permit abortion in all the circumstances listed in the bill under 
review: grave danger to maternal life or health, rape, and likelihood 
of severe disability in the child. How does the Court make such a 
turnaround? 
One might have expected the Court, in line with its communi-
tarian perspective elsewhere, to look to the common good and to ar-
gue that the protection of unborn life is not, or does not always 
result in, the highest constitutional value. But it nowhere asserts 
that other values are more important than fetal life. It mentions 
two theories by which the bill in question may be justified: legisla-
tive choice between conflicting values and the doctrine of non-de-
mandability (L.F. 10). The latter, however, is the only clear referent 
in most of the situations considered. The Court appeals primarily to 
the idea that a continuation of pregnancy in such circumstances is 
just too much for the criminal law to demand of an individual. Even 
if such abortions do more harm than good to the values of the com-
munity, the State need not punish them because there is a limit to 
what individuals must sacrifice for constitutional values. 
The doctrine of non-demandability in Spain has its origin in 
German legal thought, where it was originally conceived as an extra-
statutory defense to crime from an individualist perspective.88 It is 
felt in the Spanish Penal Code in various ways, particularly in Arti-
cle 8, to which the Court specifically refers in its opinion.89 That ar-
ticle permits the defense of necessity when an otherwise illegal act 
ered binding in conscience upon the legislature but not enforceable by courts (at 
least not against statutes). 
88. One of the earliest uses of this concept in criminal law occurred in the fa-
mous 1897 Leinenfanger decision of the Reichsgericht. There the Court went beyond 
the penal code to reason that although the omission in question "considering the 
common good ... could be demanded of the actor", one must also ask whether it 
could be demanded of the accused under the circumstances. 30 RGST 25-28, as 
quoted in Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 935. 
89. Art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code exempts various persons from criminal re-
sponsibility, including the insane and infants. Sec. 4 adds an exemption for "one 
who acts in defense of a person or rights, his own or alien (propios 0 ajenos r' as long 
as there has been illegitimate aggression, rational choice of means, and lack of provo-
cation. The key sec. 7 exempts "one who, impelled by a state of necessity, in order to 
avoid an evil of his own or one alien to him (mal propio o ajeno), injures a legal good 
(bien juridico) of another person . . . ," provided that the evil caused is not greater 
than that which he seeks to avoid, that he has not intentionally provoked the situa-
tion of necessity, and that he does not have a special obligation to sacrifice himself. 
Sec. 9 covers those who act under uirresistible force,. and sec. 10 those who act out of 
insuperable fear "of an equal or greater evil." Art. 8 thus incorporates ideas both of 
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is done in order to avoid a greater or an equal :harm. The doctrine 
of non-demandability is thought by the dominant opinion in Spain to 
account for the latter situation:90 It is just too much to demand of a 
person that he or she sacrifice a personal interest simply for the 
sake of someone else's merely equ.al interest. A concrete example of 
the influence of this doctrine is found in Article 18 of the Penal 
Code, which exempts close family members from punishment for 
harboring a fugitive. Again, one might say that the penal law just 
cannot demand that a fugitive's spouse or parent refuse to take him 
or her in, despite the general prohibition of such an act.91 
As will become evident later, it is very important to understand 
whether this doctrine is one of justification or of excuse. That is~ 
does the personal burden under which the defendant labors serve to 
make an otherwise wrong act right, or does it only mean that the 
defendant is not to be blamed (or even simply not to be punished) 
for the still wrongful act? 
The dominant theory92 in Spain appears to treat the nonde-
mandability doctrine as one of excuse~ Under such an approach, no 
one is justified in preferring his or her own values, or own spouse, to 
the values established by the community, but nevertheless such anti-
social acts are not punished where the subject in some sense could 
not act otherwise" An act which is wrongful but nonpreventable, or 
at least not preventable by means of the criminal law, is not. to be 
punished. Note that if a mere excuse for an act is involved, legiti-
mate defense against the act remains possible, and there are a 
number of other significant legal consequences to be explored later. 
On the othe-r hand, there are s.ome Spanish doctrinal considera-
tions which point to calling the non-demandability idea a justifica-
tion.93 And it can be argued that where no one, or no one except a 
~'excuse,, (what might be called "necessity in the order of events"') and of "justifica-
tion'' (what might be called "necessity in the order of ideas.,). 
Luis Jimenez de Asua, 7 Tratado de Derecho Penal196 (2nd ed., 1962, 1977) con-
·siders fear and necessity under confict of equal goods to be excuses originating in the 
non-demandability idea. He adds other examples from the Spanish Penal Code, in-
cluding the harboring of a fugitive by near relations (art. 18) and the omission of 
non-demandable aid (art. 489). 
Some Spanish opinion also supports non-demandability as a legal excuse ex-
isting outside the Penal Code, e.g. Ricardo de Angel Yaguez et aL; Ley del aborto 
100-01 (1985). 
90. Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho penal espanol, parte general at 556, 609 ... 19 (1979). 
91. The rationale for this defense is disputed, but the dominant opinion today ap .. 
pears to be that non-demandability is its basis. See Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 
1014, and Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 618-19. 
92. Both Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 932 ff. and Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 
90 at 609 ff. treat non•demandability under the more general category of exculpation 
or non-blameworthiness, i.e., as a kind of excuse rather than of justification, and as-
sert this to be the dominant view. 
93. Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 967-69, discusses sorne penalists who consider 
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hero, is in some sense able to comply with a certain legal command, 
then acts or, omissions in violation of that norm lose their wrongful 
character even though they do not avoid more harm than they 
cause. Furthermore, there are places in Spanish law where a theory 
of non-demandability seems to have resulted in a full statutory justi-
fication, in the sense of a legal certification of the non-wrongfulness 
of the conduct in question. The penal law requirements to stop 
crime (Art. 338 bis), to rescue (Art. 489 bis), and to give assistance 
(Art. -586(2)) apply only where they can be observed without .risk to 
the actor or to a third party,. Note that the omission of risky acts is 
here justified, at least in the special sense that it is e-xcluded from 
the definition (tipo) of these crimes, although Article 8 would not 
even excuse it for the actor is refusing to risk a slight personal in-
terest at the cost of greater harm to others. This contradiction can 
perhaps be overcome if we cannot demand and expect public spirited 
actions to the degree to which we exact public spirited omissions. 
Legislators supporting the enactment of the new abortion stat-
ute appealed frequently to the non-demandability notion often as 
an excuse.94 Likewise the government brief in the constitutional 
case is written as though the issue of nondemandability is one of 
whether or not a woman having an abortion should be simply excul-
pated (i.e., excused) in the specified situations.95 The only dissents 
which mention the matter in some detail link the idea of non-de-
mandability to that of legal excuse.96 
non-demandability to be a justification. Rodriguez Devesa seems to use the non-de-
mandability notion as a general concept containing all justifications and exculpa-
. . 
tions, as ·well as using it as a specific concept involving non-blameworthiness, supra 
n. 90 at 609-11. 
Note that the mere fact that an obje,ctive balancing of values may be involved is 
not necessarily a consideration leading us to classify non-demandability as justifica-
tion. As George Fletcher has pointed out, Rethinking Criminal Law 804 (1978), we 
,expect people to be: able to make greater sacrifices when more is at stake. We may 
excuse someone who breaks another's leg under the threat of losing his own, but not 
someone who blows up a city under the same threat. 
94. The socialist Minister of Justice, Ledesma Bartret, argued on 25 February 
1983 that the nondemandability of continued pregnancy in certain circumstances is a 
cause of excuse, ("inculpabilidad") for abortion. Supra n. 6 at 17. On 25 May that 
year, Saenz Coscullela, speaking "in the name of the Socialist Group'', argued that 
the abortion bill does not '"legalize". Indeed, it expresses a "generic disapprobation, 
of abortion, while establishing an "excuse" ("excusa") for therapeutic abortion, and 
refuses to blame ("inculpar'') abortions occurring where further pregnancy is not 
demandable. .Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, II Legislatura, No. 
40, at 1850. Again on 4 October 1983, the PSOE member Sotillo Marti argued, in 
favor of nonpunishment of some abortions; that where other conduct .is not demand .. 
able, an act lacks blameworthiness, i.e,, is excused. Id., No~ 61 at 2888. 
95. BJC~ supra n. 5 at 529-30. 
96. Francisco ·Tomas y Valiente insists that the abortion bill contains neither a 
legalization nor a depenalization of abortion, but simply a declaration of non-punish-
ment in certain situations, while maintaining intact the definition of the crime 
('•manteniendo intacto el tipo delictivo"}. A judge, not a physician, thus should de-
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In some of the above arguments, however, there is an undercur-
rent of justificatory reasoning.97 And on at least one occasion, 
spokespersons for the proposed legislation clearly insisted that the 
abortions at issue were to be treated as lawful, not simply 
unblameworthy. 98 
The Constitutional Court's own opinion, unfortunately, is far 
from clear. Neither in its general discussion of nondemandability 
(L.F. 9) nor in its specific applications of that idea (L.F. 11) does the 
Court label the notion "excuse" or "justification". The opinion does 
not, however, explicitly treat any abortion as justified in the sense 
that it is the best solution, the one which maximizes net resultant 
value. Except in the Court's treatment of abortion to save the 
mother's life and perhaps to avoid grave danger to her health 
(where it may possibly be treating the child as an aggressor against 
whom the mother has a right of self-defense (I.,.F. ll(a) ), the Court 
looks overtly to the idea (and only to the idea) that some pregnancy 
continuations are too much to demand of a woman. In considering 
rape pregnancies, the Court lists the constitutionally recognized val-
ues of the woman which have 'been harmed by that act of violence. 
But it does not suggest that denying her an abortion would have a 
further overall negative effect on the values at stake. Instead, it rea- · 
sons that obligating her to put up with the consequences of rape is 
not demandable (L.F. ll(b))" In the case of abortion for probable 
grave disabilities in the child, the Court is even more straightfor-
ward. The basis for non-punishment of such abortions, according to 
the Court, is that to require continuation of pregnancy would be an 
imposition on the mother beyond that which is normally demand-
able. That parents put up with the inevitable insecurity attending 
such a pregnancy is too much to demand. It is hard even to imagine 
that avoiding such parental anxiety is constitutionally a fundamen-
tal value equal to life in Spanish law, so that the Court could in any 
event appeal only to nondemandability· in order to uphold this por-
tion of the law in question (L.F. ll(c)).99 
cide when those situational requirements have been met, since the acts regulated by 
art. 417 continue being criminal ("continuan siendo delictivas"). He adds, however, 
that the basic rule prohibiting abortion appears to him of doubtful constitutionality. 
Id. at 539. See also the less clear linkage of nonculpability and excuse in the opinion 
of Jeronimo Arozamena Sierra. I d. ·at 537. 
97. Arozamena Sierra, id. Also Sotillo Marti, supra n. 94, and the government 
brief, supra n. 95. 
·98. So argued bill supporters Lopez Riaiio and .Sotillo Marti on 7 September· 
1983, supra n. 33 at 2121 and 2140-41. 
99. Despite the Constitution's explicit directive, found in art. 49, that the State 
protect the disabled, the Court does not discuss the possible repercussions which the 
legalization of such abortions may have on future public and parental attitudes and 
actions with regard to those born with severe handicaps but then this point is like-
wise ignored in the briefs. For research indicating a negative impact, see Fletcher; 
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Once again, the often unspoken background for all these Span-
ish arguments is German legal theory. It was in Germany that the 
idea of non-demandability first arose doctrinally.100 It is there used 
to explain code-based "excusing necessity", which is structured dif .. 
ferently from the necessity defense in Spain.101 The German abor-
tion depenalization statute itself permitted post-twelve-week-
gestation abortion where there was a danger to maternal life or 
health or of serious fetal defect such that no alternative to abortion 
could be demanded (zumutbar and verlangt respectively).102 
Not surprisingly, the West German Constitutional Court like-
wise uses the non-demandability doctrine to deal with abortion. The 
Court indeed appears to base its approval of hardship-case abortions 
exclusively upon this idea even where continued pregnancy would 
threaten a woman's own life or health.103 It applies the doctrine 
without further argument to the case of potentially grave disability 
abortions (which the Court calls "eugenic" abortions)104 and to "so-
cial" abortions involving equivalent hardship because of the wo-
man's life context. Unfortunately, the Court sends mixed signals on 
the issue of whether nondemandability makes all these abortions 
justified or merely excused.105 
Spanish commentary upon the German constitutional settle-
"Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns," 2(1) Hastings Center Studies 21 (January 
1974). 
Nor does the Court anywhere suggest the now commonplace notion that life 
with severe disabilities may have relatively little value or even be a clisvalue. Such a 
suggestion would obviously go a long way toward tipping the scales in favor of paren-
tal interests. · 
100. For a discussion of the nature and context of the German (and, indirectly, 
the Spanish) concept of uunzumutbarkeit", see Fletcher, supra n. 93 at 833 ff. and 
Albin Eser, "Justification and Excuse," 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1976). See also 
Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 930 ff. 
101. The German Penal Code separates necessity (Notstand) into two articles, 34 
and 35, and titles the first "Justifying Necessity" and the second "Excusing Neces-
sity." According to the latter, certain persons are excused when they must act ille· 
gaily to avoid a danger to life, limb, or liberty, unless they could have been expected 
{demanded, ''zugemutet,) to accept the risk involved. See e.g., Dreher & Trondle, 
Strafgesetzbuch 188, 196 (42nd ed. 1985). 
102. The actual statute was somewhat more complex than this summary. See 
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 4-6, and Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 611-12. 
103. (1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 647 ... 48. See also supra n. 49. 
104. Id., indicating approval of earlier governmental arguments in favor of non-
punishment of disability- and rape-based abortions. 
105. For example, the Court indicates that even where abortion is not punished, 
the State is expected to remind a woman of her "fundamental duty (Pflicht) to re-
spect the right to life of the unborn, to encourage her to continue the pregnancy." 
Id. Yet the Court late.r insists that the law distinguish the justified (gerechtfertigt) 
cases of abortion from the reprehensible (verwerflich) ones. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 
58; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 654-55. Sorting out these remarks in light of the basic prin-
ciples governing the decision, the Dreher & Trondle commentary concludes that the 
Constitutional Court's decision points in the direction of an excuse understanding: 
supra n. 101, prenote 9 to§ 218, at 999-1000. 
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ment, prior to Spain's own proposed law reform, was generally criti-
cal. Commentators both opposing106 and favoring107 extensive 
abortion rights had difficulty understanding how non-demandability 
could permit abortion in the face of the German high court's strong 
affirmation of the duty of the State to protect unborn life. At most, 
it was argued, the Court's reasoning would lead to excusing such 
abortions, not to justifying them. . 
United States criminal law does not contain an explicit defense 
of non-demandability. Our "duress" or "coercion" defense, which is 
generally considered an excuse, is perhaps its closest analogue, but 
that defense is more limited than the Spanish Article 8 or German 
"excusing necessity".108 It could not apply to abortion because no 
one is threatening harm to the mother unless she ends her preg-
nancy. There exists for us no comprehensive penal or constitutional 
principle which ensures that no one is punished for doing an act 
whenever not doing the act is ''too much to demand"" 
Despite our restricted theory of excuses, however, it could be 
argued that something like non-demandability pervades 011r law, and 
does so often in the form of justification. After all, except in Ver-
mont, we do not require rescues of strangers in the first place, not 
even where they involve_ no risk whatsoever. It has been suggested 
that it is too restrictive to impose on everyone that they be good sa-
maritans.109 Again, we sometimes permit a violent response to -ag-
gression, even where retreat is possible, and especially where retreat 
would involve some risk .. 11° Are we perhaps saying that it is too 
much to ask of victims that they act against their own interests in 
order to protect the interests of aggressorst even when the net harm 
caused by resistance is much greater than that caused by retreat? 
Roe v. Wade obviously did not need to draw upon anything like 
the above lines of reasoning; its denial of constitutional value in the 
unborn child meant that it did not have to search for a justification 
or excuse for abortion beyond. the right of privacy. But there have 
been a number of scholars who have sought to justify the result in 
Roe, elective abortion, by appealing to our alleged tradition of "bad 
samaritanism".111 The explicit thrust of these arguments is that 
even if the fetus were recognized to be a living human being, _and 
106. Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 25, at 99. Rodriguez Devesa latter joined in the 
book En Defensa de la Vida, supra n. 35. opposing the abortion depenalization bill. 
107. Arroyo Zapatero, supra n. 34 at 205. 
108. Supra n. 101. The German penal art. 35 is limited to excusing those who pro-
tect themselves or those near to them. But there remains some support for nonde-
mandability as an extrastatutory defense. · 
109. Calabresi, supra n. 68 at 102-03, reports and disagrees with this sentiment. 
110. See e.g., the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii). 
111. See- e.g., Regan, "Rewriting Roe v. Wade., 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979) and 
Thompson, "A Defense of Abortion," 1 Philos. & Pub. A.ffidrs 47 (1971). 
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even if it were seen to be a person possessing a constitutional right 
to life, elective abortion would be permissible because our law does 
not generally require individuals to aid others at substantial cost to 
themselves. Though I have not found these thoughts to coalesce 
around precisely the non-demandability doctrine of Europe, surely 
something similar is at work here. If elsewhere we are individual-
ists believing in laissez faire and laissez mourir, it must seem to 
many of us "too much to demand, of a pregnant woman that she 
alone make great sacrifices ,a point to which I return at the end of 
this commentary. 
CRITIQUE OF THE "Too MUCH TO DEMAND" DOCTRINE 
There are three final points I would like to make at some, 
length. The first is that the concept· of non-demandability, even if 
accepted as a starting point for legal reasoning, is incapable of doing 
what its adherents want it to do; namely of giving at least some 
abortions the full support of the law. The second is that non-de-
mandability is in fact unacceptable as a first principle of reason, for 
it obscures as much as it reveals. The third is that, despite its defi-
ciencies, the doctrine remains extremely useful to show that the 
abortion dilemma .is merely one manifestation of the tension be-
tween community and individual and that a solution to the dilemma 
depends, therefore, on a, reluation of the tension .. 
As we have seen, there are two ways to understand Spanish 
(and German) constitutional law on abortion that the legislature 
may treat some abortions as excused or that it may treat them as 
justified. My argument is that under both hypotheses a tension re-
sults, in the law,- but only in the latter case does it approach a 
contradiction. 
The first hypothesis excuse seems to me the most plausible 
interpretation of the Spanish court's opinion. The doctrine of non-
demandability is ordinarily treated in Spain112 and in Germany113 as 
one involving excuse. Given both courts' refusal to affirm that the 
unborn child has substantially less legal value than the mother, it is 
hard to see how any abortion (except, perhaps; for the mother's life) 
could be justified without at least a great deal of argumentation, 
which is left unsupplied.114 Moreover, the Spanish law in question 
bears a stronger resemblance to Penal Code Article 18 (excusing 
family members who harbor a fugitive} than it does to Article 489 
bis (declaring a duty to rescue only where there is no risk to one-
112. Supra n. 92. 
113. Albin Eser, supra n. 100 at 627, 637. This essay is also a useful introduction 
to the basic structure of German (and of much of Spanish) penal theory. 
114. See generally the Dreher & Trondle discussion cited, supra n. 105. 
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self). Like the former and unlike the latter, the abortion depenal-
ization law does not expressly alter the definition {type) of the 
crime but only precludes the imposition of punishment in certain 
cases. This difference, I think, should be understood to be one of 
excuse vs. justification_, as has been argued. 
As excuse, non-demandability can be given a fairly precise 
meaning. Penalties are set according to what is ordinarily necessary 
for deterrence and must not be excessive in proportion to ultimate 
culpability. But then persons having to make unusually 'high sacri-
fices in order to comply with the law cannot be compelled to do so. 
Such persons are arguably both less culpable (because the net harm 
caused by the excused offense is less than that caused by an ordi-
nary offense where no harm is at the same time avoide.d) .and less 
deterrable (because again of the unusual personal harm resulting 
from failure to commit the offense). Thus, within the limits set by 
proportionality [See L.F. 10]; there may be no penalty adequate to 
deter individuals from acts necessary to avoid great personal hard-
ship. Without an adequate deterrent motive, the ''ideal type" ra-
tional self-interested individual may be literally unable to comply 
with the law. And where the threat of punishment can serve no 
purpose, it should not even be made. Acts involving great and unu-
sual hardship cannot be exacted11!> by ex post facto penalties and 
should, therefore, be excused by law even if those acts have a net 
negative effect on public values. 
Excuse fits better than justification into the communitarian 
ethos of the Spanish decision. It is perhaps n~t logically inconsis-
tent, but it certainly would be a shift in ideology for a court one mo-
ment to emphasize duties to pursue common values and the next 
moment to declare. individuals to be legally justified in destroying 
those values. By contrast, there would be nothing strange about a 
fully developed socialist jurisprudence recognizing that human be-
ings are not (or at least not yet) so constitutecl as to be able in all 
circumstances to give the same weight to others' interests as. they do 
to their own. Where this is the case, proportionate punishment may 
serve little purpose. The penal law, at least, should excuse such un-
justified self-preference~ 
But, for a number-of reasons excuse thinking alone cannot fully 
legalize abortion. Excuse is considered to apply only to the person 
so burdened that he or she is unable to act rightly toward the fetus. 
It is not thought to apply to third parties. Specifically, it would 
115. "Exactability, is the word used by Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3, to translate 
Zumutbarkeit. I have ordinarily preferred "demandability, because of its greater 
normative resonance in English, but here the more physically coercive feeling of the 
word "exacted" c~ptures the point better. 
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seem not to apply to the doctor performing the abortion any more 
than the excuse of duress applies to bystanders who help a 
threatened person carry out some difficult crime. The government's 
strongest argument, non-demandability as excuse, in favor of its 
statute makes little sense, for that statute clearly exempts from pun-
ishment all parties to certain abortions, not just the mother. The 
difficulty of excusing the aborting physician had been noticed al-
ready in 1982, in a quite cogent Spanish law journal article.116 If the 
anti-abortion brief had contained more than its one exceedingly 
short reference to this point, 117 perhaps the Court would not en-
tirely have overlooked this stumbling block in its lengthy summary 
of the arguments. 
At this time, of course, the non-punishment of the doctor has 
been approved. That is the Court's holding, regardless of whether or 
how that conclusion is supported by its reasoning (at least until 
fuller argument leads it to a different conclusion). The principle of 
legality, the principle of non-punishment without a prior statutory 
violation, would seem to preclude any penalty for a physician doing 
an abortion in one of the specified circumstances. But this does not 
entirely dispose of our problem. If abortion is only excused rather 
than justified under penal law, what is its status in civillaw?118 For 
example, could a father sue for damages because his unborn child 
has been aborted? (Or could he sue a physician for negligently fail· 
ing to abort his handicapped infant?) Must, or even may, State so-
cial insurance programs pay for the commission of acts still 
considered unlawful? And what is the legal status of a contract to 
deliver abortifacients if abortion remains legally unjustified?119 
Even more significantly, if abortion remains always wrongful al-
beit excused, could not third parties intervene to stop abortion of de-
velopmentally disabled fetuses, especially if they did so in some 
minimally intrusive non-violent way? The necessity defense in the 
United States has not been very successful in preventing the convic-
• 
116. Cerezo Mir, supra n. 31. 
117. Petitioners' supplementary brief of 3 January 1983 [sic] at 16. 
118. The Spanish court opinion, in L.F. 14, explicitly avoids resolving the civil law 
issues raised by the non-punishment of abortion. BJC, supra n. 5 at 536. (Not all the 
issues I here raise were, however, brought forward in petitioners' briefs.) Rodriguez 
Devesa, supra n. 90 at 557, 616 points out that civil responsibility remains for excused 
criminal acts. See also Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 89 at 201 ... 02. Jonas & Gorby, in 
their commentary supra n. 3 at 591-92, raise the possibility of civil suits in Germany, 
and the Dreher & Tronclle discussion cited supra n. 105, makes clear that the legiti-
macy of social insurance payments for unpunished but possibly still unlawful abor-
tions is a live issue in Germany. See also the excellent survey and argument by 
Kluth, who concludes that abortion remains illicit and therefore cannot be a duty in 
civil law, "Zur Rechtsnatur der indizierten Abtreibung," 5 ZJ.ges.FamR 440 (1985). 
119. See the Spanish Civil Code art. 1275, which deprives contracts for an illicit 
cause of any effect. An illicit cause is defined to be one opposed to laws or morals. 
Cf. the German Civil Code, art. 134. 
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tion of those who sit in at abortion clinics,120 but Spanish law looks 
very different. Article 8's idea of necessity (preservation of the 
greater legal value) could be appealed to. Non-violent intervenors 
could argue "legitimate defense" just as a bank teller can defend 
himself or an associate against a robber acting non~culpably under 
duress.121 Most precisely on point may be that in Spain a person is 
justified in preventing another from destroying something of his or 
her own which has social utility.122 
120. See, e.g., Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 
483 (1983); City of St. Louis v. Klocker 637 S.W. 2d 174 (Mo. App. 1982); Cleveland v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. 
App. 3d 288, 48 Ill. Dec. 141, 416 N .E.2d 36 (1980); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 
1291 (D.C. App. 1979). These post-Roe lower courts have generally refused even to 
listen to necessity arguments concerning the fact and value of prenatal life. Their 
opinions are fascinating in the light of the constitutional models developed earlier in 
this article. One might have thought that American courts would construe Roe's 
constitutional right to abortion to be solely a rule against state intervention, particu-
larly after the Maher and Harris cases (see supra n. 80 and 83 and accompanying 
text}. Private intervention in abortion clinics (to protect what proffered evidence 
supposedly would show to be human life with significant ethical, statutory, or com-
mon law value) would remain unaffected by Roe and so possibly justified. But in 
fact virtually all lower court opinions treat Roe as imposing a negative value judg-
ment, in regard to the fetus, on the whole legal order, quite analogous to the positive 
value imposed in Spain and Germany. The analogy is close: In those European na-
tions the mandated high value of fetal life requires the State to punish conduct 
which destroys the fetus. In the U.S. the mandated low value of fetal life requires 
the State not to refrain from punishing conduct which prevents fetal destruction. 
It could be argued that some of these lower courts have disallowed the necessity 
defense simply to prevent disorder at abortion clinics, without any sense of constitu-
tional mandate. But the bare possibility of acquittal under necessity might not sig-
nificantly increase the number of sitters willing to be arrested at abortion clinics. 
And even if clinic chaos were to result, a quick fix might be had in the form of a 
legislatively imposed abortion exception to the necessity defense. Judicial imposition 
of such an exception would not be required. 
121. Both Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 557, 616 and Jimenez de Asua, supra 
n. 89 at 201-02 make clear that forcible defense is legitimate against acts which are 
merely excused. The former specifically applies this principle to the law excusing a 
parent who harbors a fugitive, at 619. The explicit wording of art. 8( 4), referring to 
the defense "of the person or (of] rights" might not apply to the defense of the "legal 
good" of unborn life, but art. 8(7) would seem to offer obvious support for abortion 
clinic interventions. The latter permits actions against personal goods in order to 
avoid any "alien" evil. See the precise wording, supra n. 89. Of course, there would 
also have to be a weighing of the harm caused by the intervention against the value 
of any fetal life saved. In Spain this calculus is ordinarily based upon a comparison 
of the usual criminal penalties for, say, trespass and abortion. Rodriguez Devesa, 
supra n. 90 at 546. The result of the balancing might well vary depending upon the 
means and consequences of the sit-in. 
The wording of the German Penal Code is even more favorable to such defenses. 
In addition to the necessity arguments of arts. 34 and 35 of the Penal Code, supra n. 
101 arts. 32 and 33 would seem to provide another justification and excuse argument 
for nonviolent clinic interventions. These Notwehr defenses are available to those 
who act to protect "another" against an unlawful attack, and the German court deci-
sion seems potentially open to an interpretation of the unborn child as Hanother". 
See supra n. 38-46 and accompanying text. 
122. Rodriguez Devesa, id. at 554. 
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Nor are these arguments merely technical or sophistic. It is 
clearly one thing to say that someone does not deserve punishment 
for an act because she could not be expected to behave otherwise, 
and quite another for the State to support or even not to prevent 
that act. Remember that non-demandability is a penal law doctrine; 
there are some things which are supposedly too much to demand by 
means of ex post facto penalties. The Spanish court's own discussion 
of non-demandability theory (L.F. 10) emphasizes that penal punish-
ment for failure to comply with a legal norm is sometimes "totally 
unsuitable", which does not entail that the norm itself is to be called 
into question. The Court also points out that the State's duty to pro-
tect the legal good of life continues to subsist in other areas. If the 
State allows civil suits against abortionists, denies insurance cover-
age, does not recognize contracts, and does not punish sit-ins in abor-
tion clinics or the equivalent, it is not imposing punishment on 
women who have had abortions. There is nothing incoherent in a 
legal system which makes all abortions illegal, but excuses some wo-
men who have them with the thought that compliance with the law 
is too much to demand of persons in great distress. To the contrary, 
a system would be incoherent which punished justified acts (e.g., sit-
ins)123 in order to further excused ones (i.e., abortions). 
That this is the present state of Spanish law is implied by a 
number of sources. Proponents of abortion depenalization, and at 
least one of the high court dissenters, argued that abortions were 
not being "legalized", as has been pointed out above.124 Opponents 
of abortion now read the Court decision to say that abortion has not 
become "licit".125 If such statements mean anything, they indicate a 
legal situation very close to that which has been described and very 
far from a legal right to abortion. 
Can a case be made for a contrary interpretation of the Spanish 
decision, that it declares non-demandable abortions to be not excusa-
ble but justifiable and that the statute upheld is in fact one of justifi-
123. If non-violent clinic intervention were futile (in the sense that women wish-
ing abortions will invariably simply postpone them if a particular clinic becomes un-
available for a time), the necessity justification for sit~ins would lose much of its 
force. But the mere fact that pregnancy continuation is too much to demand by 
means of a posteriori punishment does not, without more, prove that prior interven• 
tion to close clinics or to dissuade women might not be effective and normatively 
called for. Surely a legal system could appropriately abolish penalties for some or all 
(attempted) suicides, under nondemandability excuse thinking, without entailing the 
abolition of defenses to battery for those who intervene to prevent suicides. 
124. Supra n. 94 and 96. But cf. supra n. 98. 
125. So argues Federico Trillo-Figueroa in his early unpublished response to the 
Court entitled "En defensa de la vida, (the same title as that of the pre-decision 
book referred to supra n. 35 and to which he contributed). The anti-abortion com-
mentary Ley del aborto, supra n. 89 at 91 ff., 327, also asserts and implies the contin-
uing illicitude of almost all abortions. 
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cation? The most obvious argument in favor of this interpretation is 
not a legal but a political one. There might be little point in bring-
ing about a legal situation which keeps women out of jail but which 
may well have very little effect on the actual availability of abortion~ 
If abortion ,remains wholly illicit, clinics will be under burdens so 
great that they may find it unprofitable to operate. But an attempt 
at legal argumentation can also be made: Excuse reasoning is hard 
put to explain the Court's approval of the non-punishment of the 
aborting physician~ 126 And the analogy of abortion law to fugitive 
law is not perfect. In the latter case, only certain actors (i.e., family 
members) are declared exempt from punishment. In the former, 
the act itself of abortion is declared non-punishable!~ From the point 
of view of penal law, what can be made of a norm without a pen-
alty? Perh~ps the definition {type) of the crime of abortion has in 
effect been cut back after all, though not by the direct wording used 
in the Penal Code's article 489 bis-requiring rescue.127 
There is an undeniable appeal in the justification interpretation 
of non-demandability. Always to value the interests of others 
equally with one's own is a heroic or saintly ideal. To demand com-
pliance with this ideal would clearly often be too much·---whence the 
argument for excuse. But even to ask for heroic behavior may seem 
uncalled for. Don't we have a right not to be heroes, without incur-
ring legal disapprobation? Quite a few spokespersons for abortion 
reform made just such an appeal, saying that to bear a child after 
rape or one likely to be gravely disabled is to be heroic, not just law-
abiding. Analogies were made to self-defense law, which gives the 
victim's interest priority over that of the aggressor, and to the legal 
permission not to rescue others where any personal risk is in-
volved.128 In those situations, too, the law recognizes an apparent 
126. The Dreher & Trondle commentary, however, has little problem treating the 
physician's exemption as based upon separable public health grounds. That is, in or ... 
der for excused abortions to be performed in safety, physicians are permitted to per-
form. them, without implying that the law favors or is even neutral on the question 
of whether abortions should occur. Supra n. 101, prenote 9e to art. 218; at 1001-02. 
Spanish law has a similar catch-all category of excuse, called the excusa absolutoria, 
which the law could use to understand the status of the aborting physician. See 
Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 and 89. But cf. Nathanson, Aborting America 193-94 
(1979), who argues that the advent of modem antibiotics, of the plastic suction cu-
rette, and of self-abortive drugs makes illegal abortion no longer a major public 
health problem even if the medical :abortionist is held penally accountable. 
127. Despite its own conclusion that abortion is only excused, the 
Dreher=Trondle commentary, id., makes clear that the dominant legal opinion in 
Germany is that non-punished abortions are to be considered justified. See generally 
Eser, ''Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences," 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 
369, 375 n. 40 and accompanying text (1986) and Gropp, Der stra/lose Schwanger-
schaj'tsabbruch (1981). The latter's arguments virtually ignore the need to integrate 
penal and constitutional theory, however, while the Dreher & -Trondle_ argument is 
built upon an attempt at such integration. 
128. On 25 May 1983, in the Congress of Deputies, the PSOE spokesperson Saenz 
• 
• 
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right not to sacrifice one's own lesser interests for the sake of 
others' greater interests. The communitarian principles of the ne-
cessity defense here give way to a deep individualism. 
Such a politico-legal theory is quite evidently not in harmony 
with a spirit of dedication to common goals. Instead, it would seem 
to be founded on something like social contract reasoning. People 
with essentially private interests come together out of a limited need 
for mutual defense and cooperation. They agree to accept a certain 
burden, but no more, for the sake of their joint enterprise. Once 
they have made the maximum expected contribution, they have a 
right to refuse further payments. Where an act or omission is neces-
sary in order to avoid an excess contribution to public values, that 
act or omission is legally justified. 
It is a strange beast, this hybrid of Social State and social con-
tract. From the point of view of community values, the act or omis-
sion is wrong. It results in a net value loss. Yet from the point of 
view of the individual, the act is right. The non-hero reasons that 
one should not have to give to the community anything more than 
one thinks one is likely to need from the community. Since he or 
she is certainly never going to be a fetus in need of maternal sup-
port, why should he or she feel obligated to give such support?129 
The idea of non-demandability can in this way be thought to 
justify abortion (particularly in circumstances of unusual hardship) 
despite the fact that the values of the community, the values for the 
sake of which we have come together, thereby suffer. Abortion is 
somehow justified and not justified at the same time. The commu-
nity permits abortions without saying that abortions ought to occur. 
What legal concepts can express the permission to be nonher-
oic in regard to abortion or to non-rescue or to other analogous sit-
uations? Surely not "claim" and "duty". The fact that someone 
violates no legal duty in refusing to maximize the common good of 
Cosculluela argued that the law values one's own life more than that of another, and 
that the law cannot demand heroism of a pregnant woman, supra n. 94 at 1853, 1854. 
On 7 September 1983, Sotillo ;M:arti argued for the abortion depenalization bill by ap-
pealing to the fact that the law does not always demand that we rescue others, even 
though it may be our moral duty to do so. Again on 5 October 1983, he argued that 
to require the continuation of pregnancy in the hardship conditions covered by the 
proposed law would be to demand heroism, which the Penal Code does not do when 
it comes to rescue. Supra n. 33 and 31 at 2138, 2946. 
Cf. Sanford Kadish's important attempt to understand the interaction of the 
values of proportionality and autonomy: 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in 
the Criminal Law," 64 Cal. L. Rev. 871 (1976). 
129. Someone who thinks in this way puzzlingly overlooks the fact that he or she 
has already needed and received aid as a fetus. Yet such an analysis appears domi· 
nant in the decisions in question. Nowhere is the duty to support new life treated in 
these cases as a matter of simple reciprocity for benefits everyone has earlier 
received. 
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life does not mean that others violate a legal duty in striving by 
means other than penal law to further that good. In other words, 
any Spanish (or German) permission to abort should be labeled a 
"liberty"130 rather than a "right". The State does not insist sub 
poena that a pregnancy continue, but neither may a pregnant wo-
man insist upon support or protection for abortion. In this view, 
abortion would be objectively legal, not only excused, but it would 
be legalized only as a liberty and not as a claim upon the commu-
nity. Such an understanding is similar to an old way of looking at 
the legal situation called "necessity" that it returns all parties in-
volved to a "state of nature", where legal duties and claims in the 
full sense do not yet exist.131 
But if abortion is only a liberty, involves only the absence of pe-
nal prohibition, necessity doctrine might still justify intervention to 
prevent abortions.132 Necessity always involves individual interfer-
ence with what are otherwise legal rights of others. Even where one 
is not legally required to furnish his coat to a freezing child, the 
child may be excused and even justified in taking it. Or, better, sup-
pose a nonswimmer bystander to be watching helplessly as an un-
known child lies drowning at the bottom of a pool. A good s · er 
walks by but refuses to help because he already has a cold and does 
not wish to risk making it worse. The bystander blocks the swim-
mer and grabs his hat, telling him he will not get it back unless he 
rescues the child. Would a court convict the nonswimmer of battery 
or of theft? I suspect not. Thus even assuming arguendo that we 
think the swimmer legally justified in refusing to help, we may also 
think the nonswimmer justified in forcing him to help. That we do 
not use the criminal law to coerce people into making sacrifices does 
not mean that we do not wish such sacrifices to be made, nor that 
we are willing to use criminal penalties to ensure that no sacrifices 
are made. If pregnancy is only like rescuing, and both are just some-
times too much to demand by means of criminal penalties, then 
abortion has not yet won the full support of the law. Particularly 
under a jurisprudence of "effective'' community values, it would 
seem that courts ought to ignore rules wherever acts further the 
greater constitutional value. And, at least in the case of abortion to 
avoid bearing a disabled child, it would be very hard for a Spanish 
tribunal to find that prevention of such an abortion, by means of 
130. The reference here is to the concept which Hohfeld calls "privilege". See 
generally, Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919). 
131. See discussion in Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 555. 
132. And civil damages for abortion might still be recoverable by a father. Even 
an act that is justified under penal law may incur liability for civil damages. See Pe-
nal Code art. 20, ~nd the commentaries thereon by Jimenez de Asua, e.g., supra n. 89 
at 198-99. 
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non-delivery of abortifacients or of a non-violent sit-in, is not in ac-
cord with the constitutional order of values. On the side of the fetus 
are the values of life and of protection for the handicapped, while 
the Court mentions no constitutional value at all on the side of 
abortion. 
The theoretical and practical disadvantages of the conclusion 
reached here are obvious. Abortion, even if fully legal in the sense 
that non-rescue in the face of risks is fully legal, may still not be-
come easily available ~because non-cooperation with, and even in-
tervention against, the performance of abortion may be justified by 
the thinking at the base of the necessity defense. Conceptual and 
public order may thereby be threatened. These disadvantages do not 
often arise in the parallel case of non-rescue, because not rescuing 
another does not ordinarily require the participation of third parties, 
nor does the intervention of third parties ordinarily preclude not 
rescuing. By contrast, abortion necessarily implicates third parties 
and the judicial system which judges those parties. 
If the idea of non-demandability were limited to excusing wo-
men who undergo abortions, it would lead to no such anomalous re-
sults and would probably find near universal support. Most states in 
the U.S., for example, de facto and even de jure,133 did not punish 
women for abortion prior to Roe v. Wade. But they did prosecute 
abortionists. The values of life and order are compatible with ex-
cuses which are truly and merely excuses, with the desire not to use 
penal law against women, but not with more. 
Alternatively, we can hold to a justificatory sense of the non-de-
mandability of bearing a child, letting it mean community support 
for a right not to make undue sacrifices. But we can do so in an or-
derly fashion only at the cost of devaluing human life (or of some-
how honestly separating fetal life from postnatal life). If unborn life 
has little value, abortion does little if any damage, and so contracts 
for it should be enforced and no one is justified in preventing it. 
In other words, either abortion must remain a crime (though 
one for which many or even all women need not be punished), or it 
must be seen to promote the common good (because unborn human 
life hardly counts as part of that good). Only these two solutions are 
internally coherent in theory and practice. 
Is the doctrine of non-demandability the best place to begin to 
think about which solution to seek? A good argument can be made 
that this doctrine is not a very helpful starting point (anywhere in 
133. See Wohlers. "Women and Abortion," published undated by the American 
Center for Bioethics. The author surveys pre·Roe statutory and case law and con ... 
eludes that women were almost always exempted from punishment by one or the 
other. 
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the world) because it is likely one-sidedly to obscure as much as it 
reveals of the legally significant dimensions of pregnancy and of 
abortion. 
To ask whether a continuation of pregnancy in certain circum-
stances is demandable of a woman is to emphasize exclusively the 
affirmative and sacrifical character of pregnancy. In other words, it 
makes us think of pregnancy as an act of giving and of abortion as 
an omission or a ceasing so to give. But surely in many ways abor-
tion is an act by the mother or by her agent, and continued preg-
nancy is an omission. Somehow this makes a difference. It is often 
worse legally, if not morally, to throw someone who has slipped into 
one's home out into the freezing cold than not to let her in to begin 
with. Abortion, at the least, is like that act of expulsion. And preg-
nancy, after conception, in an important sense requires no further 
acts. Gestation is automatic, one might say, as long as one omits to 
terminate it. This fact makes a difference at least psychologically. 
It is harder to pay taxes than to endure government withholding of 
them. To donate blood to a relative every day for nine months could 
easily feel like a much greater sacrifice than to have something simi-
lar occur by itself in the womb. The power of the non-demandability 
doctrine is precisely that, in all contexts (not just abortion), it makes 
us treat what could be seen as acts instead as omissions. We ask not 
"Should he have robbed the bank?" but "Can we demand that he 
have his legs be broken by those trying to force him to rob the 
bank?" I am not suggesting that pregnancy is wholly an omission 
and abortion is wholly an act, only that there are important consid-
erations on both sides and the question of non-demandability tends 
to make us overlook one side. 
This focus on omission to sacrifice also takes our eyes off imme-
diate intentions and leads us loosely to speculate about ultimate mo-
tives something we would be much less likely to do with regard to 
an act. In the abortion context, for example, many write as though 
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy were the main purpose of abor-
tions,134 though Roe itself emphasized post-natal burdens.135 But the 
desire to separate oneself from the fetus, before or after birth, is not 
the sole aim of abortions, otherwise adoption would have been men-
tioned by Roe as an alternative way to avoid the burdens to which it 
points. Clearly, many people who have abortions aim not just at 
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy or of childcare, but at not being 
mothers at all. A decisive motive may be to avoid the burdensome 
adoption choice. The intent then comes to be to kill the fetus. A le-
134. See, e.g, Regan & Thompson, supra n. 111 and Calabresi, supra n. 68-though 
the latter at 114 notes that the purpose may also be to kill the fetus. 
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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thai act with a lethal intent is much harder to justify or excuse than 
a failure to be a hero. Non-demandability makes us forget the first 
way of looking at abortion and think only about the second. 
Furthermore, just as non-demandability makes us turn away 
from the intent of an otherwise illegal act, it tends to make us forget 
the policy promoted by the particular law at issue. If we ask only 
"Can we force people to kill and risk being killed?,, we may say 
"no,. But if we ask whether -national survival justifies the military 
draft, we may say "yes"'. If new life is to be treated as a fundamen-
tal public value, as the Spanish court asserts, it cannot be omitted 
from the question of how much can be demanded.136 Yet this value 
is wholly left out of that court's demandability discussions. 
Non~demandability also, it seems to me, tends to make us think 
in very general terms. Should one have to sacrifice one;s legs? 
Should one be expected, under penalty, to put up with a handi-
capped child? The generic answer to these questions may be "no". 
But we should also refer to the various sources of a special duty to 
make sacrifices. Non-demandability does not in itself137 allude to 
those sources. 
Thus, U.S. commentators have sought to show that, even if the 
fetus were a person, the law should not impose the burden of sup-
porting him or her on the mother, any more than one should have to 
support a famous violinist who needs transfusions fo-r nine 
months.138 But if the fetus is a person, it is not only a person. It is 
also one's own child, and that fact may make all the difference. 
It is true that the Spanish high court uses the normal burdens 
of parents as a standard of what can be demanded,139 which is no 
' 
doubt higher than the standard for citizens in general. But are par-
ents committed to putting up only with "normal" burdens? This 
question is never clearly addressed. Though the Spanish court uses 
article 8 necessity as a prop for its decision,. it never discusses that 
portion of article 8 which denies the necessity defense to one who 
has a special obligation to sacrifice herself. 
Nor ,are the many possible sources of the duties of parents ex-
plored. Is there a natural duty resulting from a biological relation-
ship? Is there a duty resulting from causation, from the sexual 
creation of a situation in v1hich the fetus is in peril? Or does the act 
of intercourse involve a tacit consent to care for life resulting from 
136. See George Fletcher's argument that even excuse reasoning must involve 
value-balancing. Supra n. 93. 
137. But demandability as found in the German Penal Code art. 35 does require 
an inquiry into special legal relationships. 
138. Supra n. 111. The violinist is Thompson's creation. 
139. See L.F. 11, BJC, supra n. 5 at 535. 
• 
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that act?140 Does it matter that, if one were still a fetus, one would 
e~ter into a social contract to give birth, even under hardship, to 
other fetuses in order to be born oneself in like circumstances? 
Rather than careful analysis of the strengths of each such factor, 
non-demandability (at least as expounded by the Spanish and Ger-
man Constitutional Courts) encourages a superficial global 
assessment. 
Yet in the final analysis, despite all its flaws, the question of de-
mandability should not be overlooked. Most of the myriad sources 
of obligation listed above end up with women carrying greater bur-
dens than men. That is, the burde·ns even of ordinary pregnancy, 
not to speak of hardship pregnancy, are greater than our law places 
on non-pregnant people during most of their lives and those burdens 
fall unequally onto one sex.141 Whether or not we consciously have 
recourse to a doctrine of non-demandability, we are bound to feel 
uneasy about demanding that women alone bear such burdens. 
There are two ways, in my opinion, that this uneasiness can be 
overcome and both bring us back to the Social State. As the Span-
ish court pointed out (L.F. 11) with regard to the burden of handi-
capped children, community aid can make the sacrifices entailed by 
pregnancy and parenthood much less to the point where they may 
be demandable. If the legal community highly values unborn life, it 
ought to share the burden of bearing that life by means not only of 
social support services before and after birth, but even of special 
benefits and privileges for mothers142 including mothers who give 
up their children for adoption. That is what is often done in grati-
tude to young people who have been soldiers. 
Secondly, the community must not refrain from asking for sig-
nificant sacrifices from others besides women who have special abili-
ties to contribute to what we value in common. From taxation and 
business regulation to zoning and blood donation, .a high standard of 
expectation must be set and backed up by some sort of penalty for 
unexcused failure to comply with that standard. Only then will the 
sacrifices of pregnancy seem obviously demandable. It is on some 
level bizarre, even if logically consistent, to take a stand both against 
abortion and for a laissez-faire economy and society. 
140. Spanish law also creates another exception to art. S's: necessity defense for 
those who intentionally bring about the siate of necessity. 
141. See generally Calabresi, supra n. 68 especially at 101 f£. 
142. Glendon, supra n. 52, indicates that almost all Western nations provide-ma· 
ternity benefits, child care, paid leaves, paternity support, family benefits and the 
like to a far greater degree than is done in the U.S. Perhaps it is partially for this 
reason that the burdens at least of normal pregnancy and parenthood seem not too 
much to demand in Germany .and Spain . 
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